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Abstract
Toulouse School of Economics
Finance Department
Doctor of Philosophy
Essays on Corporate Finance Theory and Behavioral Asset Pricing
by Jieying Hong
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. The first two papers study how firms
should be structured to facilitate their access to funds in the face of agency conflicts
between borrowers (firms) and lenders (investors). The last paper analyzes the formation
and evolution of asset bubbles with boundedly rational traders.
Chapter 1 studies the relationship between firm scope and financial constraints. Con-
ventional wisdom suggests that large firms have greater financial flexibility due to di-
versification. Bringing projects under the same top management, however, can increase
the level of correlation and reduce the level of diversification, by exposing the projects
to the same manager-specific shock. I challenge the conventional wisdom and show that
such positive correlation enhances the firm’s ability to relax financial constraints. This
is because correlation can mitigate ex-post agency problem. Thus, when credit rationing
is the main concern, it is optimal to put multiple projects under the control of a big firm
rather than di!erent small firms. I also find that when credit rationing is not an issue,
large firms can create value only if the likelihood of large shocks to small ones is large.
These predictions are consistent with empirical observations.
Chapter 2 uses an optimal contracting approach to analyze the development of an in-
novative product through strategic alliance by an entrepreneur and an incumbent. The
entrepreneur has limited endowment and the development of the innovation a!ects the
profit of the incumbent because of externalities. When the externalities are positive,
an increase in the entrepreneurs endowment increases the outside option of the incum-
bent. This tightens the participation constraint of the incumbent, which reduces and
can sometimes o!set the positive e!ect in relaxing financial constraints of an increase in
endowment. The incentive compatible financial claims and the optimal organizational
structure are consistent with empirical observations.
ii
Chapter 31 analyzes whether traders experience reduce their propensity to speculate?
This paper studies a financial market populated by adaptive traders. Following Camerer
and Ho (1999)’s Experience-Weighted Attraction learning model, these traders are as-
sumed to adjust their behavior according to actions past performance: according to the
law of actual e!ect, traders reinforce actions that were actually successful in the past;
according to the law of simulated e!ect, traders also reinforce actions that would have
been successful if they had been chosen. In our economic environment, because there
is a cap on the maximum price that can be achieved, no rational bubbles can form.
In the long run, the market converges to the unique no bubble equilibrium. However
we show that learning initially increases traders propensity to speculate. In the short
run, more experienced traders thus create more bubbles. Moreover, we show that this
e!ect is stronger when traders are more sophisticated (that is, when they use the law of
simulated e!ect) and when the price cap is higher.
1This is a joint work with Sophie Moinas and Sebastien Pouget.
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Incentives and the Scope of the
Firm
1.1 Introduction
That bringing multiple projects under the same roof can relax financial constraints
has been empirically documented, in terms of higher leverage (Berger and Ofek [1]),
greater investment scale (Hubbard and Palia [2]), lower cost of capital (Hann et al. [3]),
and better dealing with credit crunch in the recent financial crisis (Kuppuswamy and
Villalonga [4]). The conventional wisdom, at least since Lewellen [5], is that bringing
projects within a firm generates more financial leeway because diversification leads to
coinsurance among projects and reduces volatility. It’s not clear, however, that bringing
projects under the same roof generates diversification. On the contrary, in Gabaix
[6], idiosyncratic shocks of firms matter in aggregate, and large firms don’t have lower
volatility. This is consistent with the evidence of approximate independence of firm
volatility to size in Stanley et al. [7].
If projects within the same firm inherit some common, firm-specific shocks, then big
firms do not generate diversification as simply bundling the cash flows of these projects.
As noted in Gabaix [6]: “If Walmart doubles its number of supermarkets [...] the newly
acquired supermarkets inherit the Walmart shocks.” Furthermore, as noted by Gabaix
[6] an important source of common shocks is “the firm’s chief executive o"cer.” Indeed,
a growing empirical literature, e.g. Bertrand and Schoar [8] and Bloom and Van Reenen
1
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[9], underscores managers as a key driver of productivity.1 This suggests that bringing
several projects under the same top manager within a big firm could increase the correla-
tion across these projects. One might fear such increased correlation would reduce their
ability to relax financial constraints. The novel contribution of this paper is to show
that, on the contrary, financial constraints can be relaxed by the positive correlation
between the projects within a firm.
To analyze these issues, we consider a three-period model with two types of risk neutral
players, managers and investors, as well as two independent and symmetric projects. The
managers are penniless and protected by limited liability and the investors have deep
pockets. At period 0, the investors choose the organizational structure, i.e., running the
two projects in two separate small firms, with two di!erent managers, or within a big
firm, under a single manager. Both projects require the same amount of initial invest-
ment from the investors. At period 1, each project can be subject to a shock, requiring
additional funding. This shock is assumed to be manager-specific. The manager-specific
productivity shocks can stem from the CEO’s death, divorce, sudden change in his be-
lief in managing the firm, and etc.. In the case of two small firms, the two projects
are subject to independent shocks, corresponding to the productivities of two di!erent
managers. In the case of one big firm, the two projects are subject to a common shock,
corresponding to the productivity of a single manager. Thus, bringing projects under the
same roof increases their correlation of shocks. The manager-specific shock is unknown
to both parties at period 0, but is revealed publicly at period 1. For each project, after
observing the shock, the investors decide whether or not to inject new funds to with-
stand the shock and continue the project. At period 2, any continued project is subject
to moral hazard. Its manager privately chooses between exerting e!ort and shirking,
as in Holmstrom and Tirole [10]. Credit constraints arise for the basic reason that the
manager must be granted a minimum incentive rent which reduces income pledgeability
and thus make it unprofitable for the investors.
At period 2, if one manager is in charge of both projects, optimally reducing the in-
centive rent involves a reward only when both projects are successful. This mechanism,
referred to as “cross-pledging” in Tirole [11], implies that the rent left to the manager
in charge of two projects is smaller than twice the rent left to the manager in charge of
a single project. Actually, the benefits of cross pledging are enhanced by the correlation
among projects, thus the increase in the correlation among projects relaxes, rather than
tightens, financial constraints.
1Bertrand and Schoar [8] find that manager fixed e!ects can explain a significant extent of the
heterogeneity in investment, financial and organizational practices and firm performance. Bloom and
Van Reenen [9] use an innovative survey tool to score the management quality of firms in the United
States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and find that the management scores are strongly
associated with productivity, profitability, Tobin’s Q, and survival rates.
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To see the rational for this result, consider the following, ultra-simplified, version of our
model: The manager-specific shock can be, with equal probability, 0 or $. In the latter
case, the project must be abandoned; it would be too expensive to continue. At period
1, each project generates an expected value Y if it is continued and 0 otherwise. In
addition, denote the rent given to the manager in charge of one project r1 and the rent
to the manager in charge of two projects r2. Due to cross pledging, r2 < 2r1. In the case
of one big firm, the two projects are subject to a common shock. Hence, both projects
are continued or liquidated together with equal probability. At period 0, the expected
pledgeable income for the investors is 12(2Y !r2). In the case of two small firms, the two
projects are subject to two independent shocks. Thus, we have both projects continued
with probability 14 , one continued and the other liquidated with probability
1
2 , and both
liquidated with probability 14 . In order to take advantage of cross-pledging, the two
projects are merged at period 1 if they are continued together. As a result, at period 0,
the expected pledgeable income for the investors is 14(2Y !r2)+
1
2(Y !r1). Since r2 < 2r1,
the investors obtain a larger expected income if projects are within a big firm than in
two separate small firms. The driving force is that, because of the cross-pledging e!ect,
pledgeable income is increasing and convex in the number of viable projects. The increase
in the correlation among shocks induces a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of
the number of viable projects, and therefore increases income pledgeability and relaxes
financial constraints. Thus, putting projects under the same roof can relax financial
constraints.
Now, we turn to study the e!ect of organizational structure on total value. In our
model, the total value is the sum of the investors’ pledgeable income and the managerial
rent. The advantage of big firms have in relaxing their financial constraint does not
necessarily imply that they generate more value. We show that, whether big firms
increase or decrease value depends on the distribution of manager-specific shock. To
our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to study the relation between optimal
organizational structure and managerial characteristics.
Consider the case where the manager-specific shock is continuously distributed over
[0,$). In our previous simple case, the shock was either 0 or $, hence the project was
always optimal to be liquidated when the shock was $. The only ine"ciency which
arises in that case was ex-ante credit rationing, i.e., the project cannot get financing at
period 0. However, with a general distribution of manager-specific shock, another type
of ine"ciency, ex-post ine"cient liquidation, may occur since at period 1 the shock can
turn out to be lower than the full value of the project while greater than the pledgeable
income.
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Whether big firms create or destroy value depends on their relative abilities in mitigating
both ex-ante credit rationing and ex-post ine"cient liquidation. If the initial outside
financing requirement is large, ex-ante credit rationing is the main concern. In this case,
the projects can only be financed if they are operated in a large firm. Hence, big firms
always dominate small firms. If the initial outside financing requirement is small, ex-ante
credit rationing is not an issue. Thus, the projects can always get financing regardless
of organizational structure. In this case, whether big firms or small firms are better in
terms of total value depends on their relative advantage in alleviating ex-post ine"cient
liquidation.
Due to the cross-pledging e!ect, the continuation of one project not only depends on
its own shock but also on the other’s. If the project is operated in a big firm, the shock
of the other project always has the same magnitude. However, in the case of two small
firms, the other shock can be small or large. If the other shock turns out to be small,
the project is more likely to be continued. If the other shock turns out to be large, we
obtain an opposite result. It implies that small firms are more likely to dominate large
firms if small shocks are more likely to occur than large shocks, i.e., the likelihood of
small shocks to large ones increases.
The predictions of our theory are consistent with the dramatic reversal in the assessment
of conglomerate mergers, which is positive during the 1960s and 1970s and then became
negative in the 1980s and 1990s.2 Bhide [17] argues that due to technological, economic
and regulatory changes during 1970s and 1980s, information asymmetries became less of
an issue in corporate financing. Hence, credit constraints were more of a concern during
the 1960s and 1970s. Our theory implies that in this context, conglomerate mergers
would create value. Credit constraint, however, became less of an issue in the 1980s and
1990s. Furthermore, it is likely that, during this period, the increased the competition in
the managerial labor market (Murphy and Zabojnik [18]) and the improvement in CEO
education (Palia [19]) reduced the proportion of large manager-specific shocks. In this
context, our model predicts that conglomerate mergers were less likely to be e"cient.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between financing constraints
and organizational structure. One segment of literature is based on the tradeo! theory
of capital structure (Lewellen [5], Higgins [20], Scott [21], Sarig [22], Leland [23], and
Banal-Estanol et al. [24]). The other segment is the internal capital market literature,
based on agency conflicts (Gertner et al. [25], Stein [26], Scharfstein and Stein [27],
Rajan et al. [28], and Inderst and Muller [29]). The present paper also underscores
2Negative view refers to Elgers and Clark [12], Schipper and Thomson [13] and Matsusaka [14];
Positive view refers to Lang and Stulz [15], Berger and Ofek [1] and Morck et al. [16].
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agency conflicts, but by taking account of manager-specific shocks, we obtain the new
finding that correlation can help big firms relax financial constraints.
This paper is also associated with the studies on the relation between managerial char-
acteristics and organizational structure. Van den Steen [30] shows that a manager with
strong beliefs about the right course of action will attract, through sorting in the labor
market, employees with similar beliefs. Dessein [31] provides a formal theory of the firm
in which managerial direction and bureaucratic decision-making play a key role. The
key di!erence in the present paper is that rather than focusing on managerial vision or
direction, we focus on manager-specific shocks.
This paper also complements the literature on managers’ span of control(Calvo and
Wellisz [32] and Rosen [33]). Rajan and Wulf [34] document the increase of managers’
span of control in past decades. They attribute the change of managers’ span of control
to three possible factors: the development of information technology, the improvement
in corporate governance and the increased competition in product markets. This paper
complements this literature by arguing that financial constraints are another important
driver of managers’ span of control.
This paper contributes to the literature regarding how firms deal with liquidity shocks.
During the recent financial crisis, lack of liquidity has been regarded as one of the main
factors contributing to the propagation of the initial shock (Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[35]). Holmstrom and Tirole [10] analyze it by focusing on whether private assets provide
su"cient liquidity and discussing the role of government in supplying additional liquidity.
The manager-specific shocks in our model can be interpreted as liquidity shocks. With
this interpretation in mind, our analysis sheds light on how firms should be structured
to withstand liquidity shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 studies di!erent organizational structures in the case without moral hazard.
Section 4 analyzes the case with moral hazard. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the
results. Section 6 presents the empirical implications and the conclusion is in Section 7.
All formal proofs are in the appendix.
1.2 The Model
There are two types of players, investors and managers, as well as two independent and
symmetric projects, A and B. Both types of players are risk neutral. The investors have
deep pockets, but do not have the necessary skills to operate any project. In contrast,











the managers are penniless and protected by limited liability. They are able to manage
the projects.
We consider a three period model, t = 0, 1, 2. The timeline is summarized as in Figure
1.1. At period 0, the two projects can be managed in two separate small firms or within
a big firm. In the former case, the two projects are operated by two di!erent managers.
In the latter case, the two projects are operated by the same manager. Each project
requires an initial investment I.
Once the manager starts overseeing the firm, things may go wrong. The manager brings
a random shock to all the projects under his management at date 1. Its magnitude is
unknown to all parties at period 0 but revealed to the public at period 1. The manager-
specific shock " is distributed according to a c.d.f F (·) over [0,+$) (with a p.d.f f(·)).3
In the case of two small firms, the two projects are managed by two di!erent managers,
hence the shocks of the two projects are independent. In the case of one big firm, the
two projects are managed by a single manager, thus the shocks are perfectly correlated.
To continue the project and reap the final cash-flow, the investors must inject additional
investment " to cover the shock. Otherwise, the project is liquidated, the additional
expense " is avoided, but the final cash-flow will be lost. The shock can be interpreted as
a cost overrun or a shortfall in cash flows to finance operating expenses. After observing
the two shocks, the investors need to make the continuation and liquidation decisions.
In other words, they determine which project to continue and which to liquidate.
At period 2, any continued project is subject to moral hazard in that its manager
privately chooses between e!ort and shirking à la Holmstrom and Tirole [10]. If the
manager exerts e!ort, the probability of success is P ; if he shirks, this probability is
lowered to P ! # but he enjoys a non-transferable private benefit B.4 The project
matures at period 2, delivering a revenue R if it succeeds and no revenue if it fails.
3Our results are robust in a more general setup where ! can be either positive or negative. If it
is positive, additional liquidity needs to be injected, otherwise, the project receives a positive interim
revenue. This general consideration would not a!ect our results at all, since what matters for financial
constraints and value is the intermediate continuation or liquidation of the project, while the positive
interim income has no impact on this decision.
4One possible explanation is that private benefits stem from the private use of the firm’s assets by
the manager. It is equivalent to cast the model in terms of cost of e!ort.
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Our model departs from Holmstrom and Tirole [10] in two crucial aspects.5 First, the
liquidity shock in our model is manager-specific rather than project-specific. This is very
crucial in the sense that the correlation of the shocks across projects di!ers according
to whether the two projects are separately or jointly managed at the initial stage. Since
Bertrand and Schoar [8], a growing empirical literature underscores the importance of
manager-specific productivity shocks.6 The manager-specific productivity shocks can
stem from the CEO’s death, divorce, sudden change in his belief in managing the firm,
and etc.7 Second, in Holmstrom and Tirole [10], the managers are assumed to have all
the bargaining power. In contrast, we assume that the investors have all the bargaining
power. With this assumption, our contracting problem is simplified. In addition, under
this assumption, there is no role for hedging policies that firms can apply to deal with
liquidity shocks, such as credit lines or liquidity hoarding. Hence, we can concentrate
our study on organizational design.8
1.3 Equilibrium without Moral Hazard
In this section, we consider a benchmark case where managers’ e!ort is observable and
contractable.
1.3.1 Two Small Firms
In the case of two small firms, one manager is only in charge of one project. At period 1,
the shocks of the two projects, "A and "B , are independent because of the combination
of the two managers. After observing "A and "B , the investors need to determine which
project to be continued and which to be liquidated, by comparing the continuation
benefit with the cost of withstanding the shock. At period 1, the continuation value
for each project is always PR and the cost to withstand the cost overrun is "i, where
i = A,B. If "i " PR, the investor will provide liquidity to continue project i. Otherwise,
5The original model in Holmstrom and Tirole [10] is a variable investment model. With that model,
each manager has an initial endowment of A. If the investors delegate the two projects to two di!erent
managers, the total initial endowment for the two projects is 2A. If the investors delegate the two
projects to a single manager, the total initial endowment for the two projects is only A. This asymmetry
of endowment in di!erent organizational structures is unappealing for modeling. Hence, we set A = 0.
In the variable investment model, based on equation (6) in Holmstrom and Tirole [10], the optimal
investment is always 0. In this paper, to deal with this issue, I turn to the fixed investment model as in
Tirole [11] and Holmstrom and Tirole [36], which is another benchmark model to discuss the liquidity
issues.
6See Adams et al. [37], Malmendier and Tate [38], Bloom and Van Reenen [9] and Kaplan et al. [39].
7The death of Steven Jobs can be a good example for the manager-specific productivity shock.
8See the details for why there is no role of liquidity hoarding or credit lines in the discussion section.
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where F (PR) is the expected continuation probability and
" PR
0 "f(")d" is the ex-
pected liquidity injection to cover the shock. This expected value can be simplified
as
" PR
0 F (")d"! I.
9
1.3.2 One Big Firm
In the case of one big firm, one manager is in charge of both projects. At period 1, the
shocks of the two projects "A and "B , a!ected by the same manager, are exactly the
same, i.e., "A = "B. After observing the two shocks, the investors decide which project
to be continued and which to be liquidated. Project i is optimal to be continued if and
only if "i " PR.
However, due to the di!erence in the correlation of the two shocks, the ex-post contin-
uation of the two projects in the case of one big firm is di!erent from that of two small
firms, as in Figure 1.2. In the case of one big firm, the two shocks are perfectly corre-
lated, hence the two projects are either continued or liquidated together. By contrast,
in the case of two small firms, the two shocks are independent, thus there are three
possible situations: the two projects are continued together, one project is continued
and the other is liquidated, and both are liquidated.
The di!erence in the ex-post continuation between the two organizational structures,
however, does not imply the divergence in the ex-ante value. At period 0, the project
is expected to face the same manager-specific shock regardless of the organizational
structure. In addition, without moral hazard, the project is continued if and only if its
continuation value is greater than the magnitude of its shock. The continuations of the
two projects are not interdependent. As a result, organizational structure is irrelevant
for value.
The main results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1.1.
In the case without moral hazard,
9If the manager-specific shock is distributed according to another c.d.f. G(·), which is second-order






F (!)d!. It indicates that the value of
the project increases with the risk of the manager-specific shock. It is because the problem faced by
each investor is actually a real option problem and the value of option is an increasing function of the
risk.
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Probability 
Two Projects Continued One Project Continued None Continued
1
(a) Two Small Firms
Probability 
Two Projects Continued None Continued
1
(b) One Big Firm
Figure 1.2: In the case of two small firms, since the two shocks are independent, there
are three possible situations: with probability F (PR)2 both are continued, with probability
2F (PR)(1" F (PR)) one is continued and the other is liquidated, and with probability (1 "
F (PR))2 both are liquidated. In the case of one big firm, since the two shocks are perfectly
correlated, with probability F (PR) both projects are continued and with probability 1"F (PR)
both are liquidated.
i) the project is continued if and only if its shock " is lower than its continuation value
PR.
ii) organizational structure is irrelevant for value.
In the frictionless environment, the traditional argument, including Myers [40], Levy and
Sarnat [41], and Adler and Dumas [42], is that putting projects under the same roof does
not alter the total value. This argument is based on the irrelevance of diversification on
value since the investors can achieve the diversification by themselves. One important
assumption for this irrelevance theorem is that organizational structure has no impact
on the real cash flows of projects.
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In this paper, the real ex-post cash flows of a project can be di!erent in di!erent organi-
zational structures, since putting projects under the same roof leads to a change in the
correlation of manager-specific shocks across projects. However, we show that the corre-
lation is irrelevant for value. This is because, without frictions, the continuations of the
two projects are not interdependent. Therefore, the correlation of the shocks would not
matter for each project’s continuation decision and thereby its ex-ante expected value.
Other research, e.g., Lewellen [5], Diamond [43], Leland [23] and Banal-Estanol et al.
[24], find that if there are frictions, i.e., bankruptcy cost or agency problem, putting
projects under the same roof can add firm value by reducing default risk or agency
costs. Similarly, in the following we study the impact of organizational structure on
financial constraints and value in the case with moral hazard.
1.4 Equilibrium with Moral Hazard
In this section, we turn to the moral hazard case where managers privately choose
between exerting e!ort and shirking. In this case, the income of each project that can
be pledged to the investors is strictly lower than its full value. Hence, two types of
ine"ciency may arise: i) ex-post ine"cient liquidation at period 1 if the shock of the
project is greater than its pledgeable income but lower than its full value; and ii) ex-ante
credit rationing, i.e., the investors are not willing to contribute the initial investment at
period 0 even if it is optimal to do so. The main goal of the present paper is to study
which organizational structure is better at dealing with these ine"ciencies. However,
before the analysis, we first need to study how the final payo!s of the project are split
between the investors and the manager in order to incentivize the manager.
1.4.1 Managerial Compensation and Income Pledgeability
At period 2, the project is subject to moral hazard in that the manager privately chooses
between e!ort and shirking. In order to induce e!ort, the manager must be granted a
positive rent. The income of the project cannot be totally pledged to the investors.
In our model, there are two possible cases at period 2: i) one manager only operates one
project; ii) one manager operates both projects. In the first case, the manager is granted
with Rb in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The incentive compatibility constraint
which guarantees that the manager prefers exerting e!ort rather than consuming private
benefits is
#Rb # B. (1.2)
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It implies that, to be incentivized, the expected gain from exerting e!ort for the manager
must be greater than the private benefit that he can consume by shirking. Hence, the
manager is rewarded B! in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The managerial
compensation is linear in performance. The maximum pledgeable income to the investors
is P (R ! B!), denoted a.
In the second case, the manager receives a reward R̂b when both projects are successful
and 0 otherwise. This sharing rule for two independent projects is an optimal incentive
scheme.10 The condition for the manager to prefer exerting e!ort on both projects rather
than on one is
P 2R̂b # P (P !#)R̂b +B, (1.3)
and the condition which guarantees that the manager works on both rather than on
neither is
P 2R̂b # (P !#)2R̂b + 2B. (1.4)
It is easy to show that condition(1.3) is redundant given condition(1.4). Thus, the





In this case, the manager is granted 2B(2P!!)! if both projects succeed and 0 otherwise.
The managerial compensation is increasing and convex in performance. The maximum
pledgeable income to the investors per project is P (R ! P2P!!
B
!), denoted b.
The optimal incentive schemes in the above two cases indicate the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2. The managerial compensation is more convex in performance if the
manager operates both projects than if he operates one project.
Proposition 1.2 implies that the convexity of managerial compensation is positively re-
lated to the number of projects under his management, i.e., the level of diversification.
In other words, the convexity of managerial compensation would be negatively corre-
lated with the volatility of the firm’s final outcome. The literature has two opposite
arguments. On one hand, Jensen and Meckling [45] and Haugen and Senbet [46] argue
that, a convex compensation scheme leads to more risk taking behavior of the manager
and hence increases the volatility of the firm. On the other hand, Smith and Stulz [47],
Starks [48] and Carpenter [49] argue that the risk-averse manager, who cannot perfectly
hedge his risk, may mitigate the risk of the outcome to reduce his own risk exposure.
Thus, the convexity of managerial compensation results in less volatility of the firm. We
10See La!ont and Martimort [44] p203 and Tirole [11] p159.
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obtain a similar result as the second group. However, in the literature, the managerial
compensation scheme is exogenously given, while in the present paper it is endogenously
determined with risk neutral managers. Hence, Proposition 1.2 provides another mecha-
nism to explain the negative relation between the convexity of managerial compensation
and the firm’s volatility.
Now we turn to the analysis on the pledgeable income. In both cases, the income that
can be pledged to the investors per project, i.e., a or b, is always lower than the full
value of the project PR. At period 1, ine"cient liquidation occurs if the shock is greater
than the pledgeable income but lower than the full value. In addition, we also obtain
that a < b, i.e., the manager can pledge more income to the investors per project if he
operates both projects than if he only operates one project. The intuition is that, when
the two projects are jointly managed, the manager can use one project as a collateral to
raise financing for the other to mitigate agency conflicts, referred to“cross-pledging” as
in Tirole [11].
Proposition 1.3. In the case with moral hazard, after the occurrence of the two manager-
specific shocks,
i) the income that can be pledged to the investors is always lower than the full value of
the project.
ii) the pledgeable income per project is larger in the case where the manager is in charge
of both projects than in the case where he is in charge of one project.
The first part of Proposition 1.3 is consistent with the argument in Ja!ee and Russell [50]
and Stiglitz and Weiss [51] that credit rationing is an equilibrium phenomenon if there
is information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. The second part is consistent
with Diamond [43] and Tirole [11] that the cross-pledging of independent projects can
mitigate agency problem and increase income pledgeability. This cross-pledging e!ect
is also similar to the coinsurance e!ect in Lewellen [5], Leland [23] and Banal-Estanol
et al. [24]. However, the underlying mechanisms are di!erent. In their papers, the
combination of two independent cash flows reduces default cost, while in this paper it
mitigates agency conflicts.
Generally speaking, financial constraint is loosened if more income can be pledged to
the investor. Hence, in the following we will study the ex-ante pledgeable income that
the investors can obtain at period 0 in the two organizational structures.
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1.4.2 Two Small Firms
In the case of two small firms, the two projects are operated separately by two di!erent
managers at period 0. At period 1, the two shocks "A and "B are independent. On
observing the two shocks, the investors need to decide which project to be continued
and which to be liquidated. There are four possible choices for the investors at period 1:
i) continue both projects; ii) continue project A while liquidating project B; iii) continue
project B while liquidating project A; iv) liquidate both. If both projects are continued
together, it is preferable they be merged due to the cross-pledging benefit.11 However,
if only one project or none is continued, there is no scope for cross-pledging.
Here, we ignore any specific sharing rule among the investors, and only consider the
total profit to them. This is due to the fact that as long as the action is profitable, there
always exists some specific rule to split the cost and the income to benefit all investors.
The total profit to the investors at period 1 is 2b ! "A ! "B in case i), a ! "A in case
ii), a! "B in case iii), and 0 in case iv). Denote c = 2b ! a = P (R ! !2P!!
B
!). If both
projects are bundled, the pledgeable income per project is b, while a is the marginal
pledgeable income for the first project and c is the marginal pledgeable income for the
second project, where a < b < c.
By comparing the net profit that the investors obtain in the four cases, we can see
that if both projects can be continued alone ("A, "B " a), they are always continued
together. If one project can be continued alone ("i " a, where i = A,B) while the other
cannot ("!i > a), the other is saved only when its shock is not greater than the marginal
pledgeable income for the second project ("!i " c), otherwise, it is liquidated. If neither
project can be continued alone ("A, "B > a), both projects can be continued together
only when the total shock is lower than the total pledgeable income of bundling the two
projects ("A + "B " 2b), otherwise, both are liquidated.
In summary, the continuation and liquidation conditions of the two projects, as in Figure
1.3, are as follows.12
Lemma 1.4.
i) The two projects are merged and continued together if "A + "B " 2b and "A, "B " c.
ii) Project A is continued while project B is liquidated if "A " a and "B > c.
iii) Project B is continued while project A is liquidated if "B " a and "A > c.
iv) Both projects are liquidated if "A + "B > 2b and "A, "B > a.
11Given merged, one manager is in charge of both projects, while the other is fired.
12See proof in Appendix.










Liquidate Project A & B
Figure 1.3: In the case of two small firms, the two projects are merged and continued
together in the dark grey area, i.e., !A+ !B # 2b and !A, !B # c; one project is continued and
the other is liquidated in the light grey area, i.e., !i # a and !!i > c, where i = A,B; both
are liquidated in the white area, i.e., !A + !B > 2b and !A, !B > a.
Without moral hazard, the continuation of one project only depends on its own shock
rather than on the other’s. However, Lemma 1.4 implies that, with moral hazard, the
two projects’ continuation become interdependent due to the cross-pledging e!ect.
Based on the interim continuation and liquidation conditions, we can simply obtain the
continuation probability per project. Since the two projects are symmetric, we consider
project A as an example. In Figure 1.3, project A is continued with project B in the
dark grey area. This probability is






In the upper light grey area, project A is continued alone. This probability is
q2 = F (a)(1 ! F (c)). (1.7)
Thus, the total probability of continuation for project A is q1 + q2. The corresponding
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b0
Continue Project A & B Liquidate Project A&B
a
Figure 1.4: In the case of one big firm, both projects are continued if !A = !B # b, while
liquidated if !A = !B > b.
Due to the symmetry, project B has the same continuation probability and expected
liquidity injection at period 1. The distribution of the continuation of the two projects
are in Figure 1.5(a).
Therefore, the ex-ante expected value per project at period 0 is
(q1 + q2)PR !E"! I, (1.9)
and the ex-ante expected return to the investors per project is
q1b+ q2a! E"! I. (1.10)
The pledgeable income to the investors is b if the project is continued with the other,
while it is a if the project is continued alone.
1.4.3 One Big Firm
In the case of one big firm, at period 0 both projects are managed by the same manager.
At period 1, the shocks are perfectly correlated, thus the two projects are either con-
tinued or liquidated together. It is never optimal to spin o! the two projects ex-post,
since the cross-pledging benefit only exists when the two projects are jointly operated
by the same manager. The pledgeable income per project is b when both projects are
continued together. Therefore, the interim continuation conditions of the two projects,
as in Figure 1.4, are as follows.
Lemma 1.5.
In the case of one big firm, the two projects are continued together if "A = "B " b,
otherwise, both are liquidated.
The distribution of the continuation of the two projects is in Figure 1.5(b). The interim
continuation in the case with moral hazard seems similar to the case without moral
hazard in that the two projects are either continued or liquidated together. However,
the di!erence between the two still hinges on the existence of the interdependent contin-
uation between the two projects. With moral hazard, the two projects depend on each
other to be continued, when the shock is greater than a while lower than b. In this case,
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Probability 
Two Projects Continued One Project Continued None Continued
1
(a) Two Small Firms
Probability 
Two Projects Continued None Continued
1
(b) One Big Firm
Figure 1.5: In the case of two firms, both projects are continued with probability q1, one
project is continued while the other is liquidated with probability 2q2, both are liquidated
with probability 1 " q1 " 2q2. In the case of one big firm, both projects are continued with
probability F (b), and liquidated with probability 1" F (b).
both projects cannot be continued alone, but can be continued together if they use each
other as collateral to raise financing.






where F (b) is the continuation probability and
" b
0 "f(")d" is the expected liquidity
injection to cover the shock.
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For the investors, they obtain pledgeable income b per project if both projects are
continued and 0 otherwise.
1.4.4 Ex-ante Credit Rationing
With moral hazard, the income of the project cannot be totally pledged to the investors.
Credit rationing may occur at period 0 when the project initiates. In this subsection,
we want to study which organizational structure is better at relaxing the financial con-
straints by mitigating the ex-ante credit rationing problem. In general, ex-ante credit
rationing is less likely to arise if the income that can be pledged to the investors is larger.
Hence, we compare the ex-ante pledgeable income generated in these two organizational
structures.
In our setup, on observing the shock at period 1, the investors need to determine whether
to inject liquidity to continue the project. The problem faced by the investors at period
0 is actually a real option problem. The pledgeable income obtained by the investors
is equivalent to the option value. In the case without moral hazard, at period 1, the
continuation of each project only depends on its own shock. Hence, the option value that
the investors obtain for each project is also determined by its own random shock. As a
result, organizational structure is irrelevant for value. However, in the case with moral
hazard, the interdependent continuation between the two projects arises. The continu-
ation of each project depends not only on its own shock but also on the other’s. Hence,
the option value that the investors obtain for each project is determined by both shocks.
In this case, correlation matters for the option value. When the two shocks are more
correlated, the risk the investors face is larger, thereby leading to a larger option value.
As a consequence, compared to small firms, big firms have an advantage in generating
pledgeable income to the investors and therefore relaxing financial constraints.13
Denote PIb as the ex-ante expected pledgeable income per project to the investors in
the case of one big firm, and PIs as the ex-ante expected pledgeable income per project
in the case of two small firms, where PIb = F (b)b !
" b
0 "f(")d", PIs = q1b + q2a ! E"
and PIb > PIs.
Proposition 1.6.
i) If PIs # I, the projects can always obtain financing at period 0 regardless of organi-
zational structure.
ii) If PIs < I " PIb, the projects can only obtain financing at period 0 if they are
operated within a big firm.
13Rigorous proof is in Appendix.
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iii) If PIb < I, the projects can never be financed at period 0 regardless of organizational
structure.
Proposition 1.6 implies that large firms are better at mitigating ex-ante credit rationing
than small firms. In this paper, the relaxation of the financial constraint stems from
cross-pledging. However, in the presence of ex-post merger option at period 1, small
firms also can take advantage of the cross-pledging benefit. As a result, the advantage
of large firms relative to small firms does not come from the fact that cross pledging
only exists in large firms, but from the fact that more correlated shocks lead to better
exploitation of cross pledging.
Proposition 1.6 also indicates that if the initial investment need is large, the projects
can only be initiated in a large firm and ex-ante credit rationing is the main concern. In
this case, large firms dominate small firms due to their advantage in relaxing financial
constraints. Nevertheless, if the initial investment need is small, the projects can always
be initiated regardless of organizational structure. In this case, ex-ante credit rationing is
not an issue. Which organizational structure is better depends on their relative abilities
in mitigating ex-post ine"cient liquidations.
1.4.5 Ex-post Ine!cient Liquidation
With moral hazard, ex-post ine"cient liquidation occurs at period 1 if the shock of the
project is lower than its full value but greater than the income that can be pledged to
the investors. In this subsection, we consider the case where PIs # I, i.e., the projects
are always initiated regardless of organizational structure. In this case, we study which
organizational structure is better at alleviating ex-post ine"cient liquidation.
Due to symmetry, we take project A as an example, and study how its continuation
depends on the organizational structure. When its shock is too low "A " a(too high "A >
c), the project is always continued (liquidated) regardless of organizational structure.
However, when a < "A " c, the continuation of project A depends on whether it is
managed in a big firm or in a small firm. If a < "A " b, project A is always continued in
the case of one big firm, while it is liquidated in the case of two small firms if the other
shock turns out to be large, i.e., "B > 2b! "A. In this case, project A is less likely to be
continued in the case of two small firms than in the case of one big firm. The decrease





f("A)f("B)d"Bd"A as the light grey area
in Figure 1.6. If b < "A " c, the project is always liquidated in the case of one big firm,
while it is continued in the case of two small firms if the other shock turns out to be
small, i.e., "B " 2b ! "A. In this case, project A is more likely to be continued in the






Project A is continued in the case of one big firm 
but liquidated in the case of two small firms
Project A is continued in the case of two small firms
but liquidated in the case of one big firm
Figure 1.6: In the light grey area, i.e., !A $ [a, b] and !B $ (2b " !A,+%), project A
is liquidated in the case of two small firms while continued in the case of one big firm. It
represents the relative cost if the two projects are managed in two separate firms. In the dark
grey area, i.e., !A $ (b, c] and !B $ [0, 2b" !A], project A is continued in the case of two small
firms while liquidated in the case of one big firm. It represents the relative benefit if the two
projects are managed in two separate firms.





0 f("A)f("B)d"Bd"A as the dark grey area in Figure 1.6.
Proposition 1.7.
The benefit in ex-post continuation of small firms relative to big firms is that the project
with shock "i % (b, c] is saved by the other project with shock "!i " 2b ! "i; The cost
in ex-post continuation is that the project with shock "i % (a, b] is dragged down by the
other project with shock "!i > 2b! "i.
The rationale behind Proposition 1.7 is that if the project is operated together with the
other project within a big firm, the shock of other project is exactly the same. However,
if the project is operated in a separate firm, the magnitude of the other project’s shock
can be small or large. If the other shock turns out to be small, the project is more likely
to be continued when it is managed in a small firm than in a big firm. If the other shock
turns out to be large, we obtain an opposite result. In our model, the project can be
continued in big firms if only if its shock is lower than b. In small firms, the project, even
with a shock larger than b, can be saved by the other with a small shock. Alternatively,
the project, even with a shock lower than b, can be dragged down by the other with a
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large shock. As a result, if the likelihood of small shocks relative to large ones increases,
big firms will be less able to mitigate ex-post ine"cient liquidation than small firms.
Example: the manager-specific shock is uniformly distributed over [0,#].
The di!erence between the light grey area and the dark grey area in Figure 1.6 represents
the di!erence of the continuation probability per project between the big firm case and












If the manager-specific shock is uniformly distributed over [0,#], i.e., f(·) = 1" , by
computing equation (1.13) we find that i) if # " b, i.e., the maximum shock is su"ciently
small, both projects can always be continued regardless of organizational structure; ii) if
b < # " 2b, i.e., the likelihood of large shocks relative to small ones is small, the projects
are more likely to be continued in small firms than in big firms. iii) if # > 2b, i.e., the
likelihood of large shocks relative to small ones is large, the projects are less likely to be
continued in small firms than in big firms.14
Moreover, we can also compare the value di!erence per project between the two organi-














By computing the above equation when f(·) = 1" , we find that i) if # " b, small firms
and big firms generate the same value per project; ii) if b < # " ##, where ## % (b, 2b),
small firms generate a larger value per project than big firms; iii) if # > ##, small
firms generate a smaller value per project than big firms. Generally speaking, more
continuation leads to larger value. Hence, the qualitative argument on value is similar
to that on continuation probability. However, ## < 2b. It indicates that the range for
small firms dominating big firms in terms of value is smaller than in terms of continuation
probability. This is because, the expected cost to withstand shocks is larger in the small
firm case than in the big firm case.
Proposition 1.8.
14See proof in Appendix.
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If the shock is uniformly distributed over [0,#],
i) relative to big firms, the continuation probability for each project in small firms is the
same if # % [0, b], larger if # % (b, 2b], and smaller if # % (2b,+$).
ii) relative to big firms, the value per project generated by small firms is the same if
# % [0, b], larger if # % (b,##], and smaller if # % (##,+$), where ## % (b, 2b).
This result tells us that big firms can generate a larger value than small firms if # is
su"ciently high, i.e., # > ##, i.e., the likelihood of large shocks to small ones is large.
Our results show that in terms of relaxing ex-ante financial constraints, big firms are
always better than small firms, while in terms of total value, big firms can either be better
or worse than small firms depending on the distribution of manager-specific shock. If




The main element driving the results in the present paper is the fact that projects
are subject to manager-specific shocks. Nevertheless, our results are robust in a much
broader environment.
The main implication for manager-specific shocks is that the shocks of the two projects
become more correlated if they are managed within the same firm. In addition to
manager-specific shocks, there are other productivity shocks leading to an increase in
the correlation across projects in big firms, such as, quoted in footnote 5 in Gabaix [6],
the shocks coming from “a decision of the firm’s research department, of the firm’s chief
executive o"cer, of how to process shipments, inventories......” or the shocks stemming
from “changes in capacity utilization, and, particularly, strikes.” In fact, as long as the
shock is company-specific, our results are robust. This is because firm-specific shocks
always make projects more correlated when they are managed within the same firm than
in separate firms.
In our setup, for simplicity we consider a case where the projects are subject to manager-
specific shocks at the intermediate date. However, in reality, in addition to manager-
specific shocks, projects may be also subject to project-specific shocks. In this case,
the shocks of projects within a big firm are not perfectly correlated but we should still
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observe an increase in the correlation of shocks when projects are put under the same
roof. This increase in the correlation leads to a larger option value (pledgeable income)
to the investors. Our results are still robust.
1.5.2 Hedging
In the case with moral hazard, the outside investors may not be willing to provide
liquidity to continue the project when the shock occurs, even if it is optimal. This
naturally raises the question as to whether or not it is best for firms to hedge ex-ante,
by hoarding liquidity or using credit lines, to deal with the shortage in liquidity ex-
post. This issue was addressed in Holmstrom and Tirole [10]. Their main assumption is
that managers have all the bargaining power, and this, in turn, generates the need for
hedging.
We turn to the simple one-project case in Tirole [11]15 to discuss the intuition of hedg-
ing policies in Holmstrom and Tirole [10]. The project is optimal to be continued at
intermediate date if and only if " < "#. The manager’s expected payo! is









"f(")d"! I = 0. (1.16)
We can show that a < "# " PR. The optimal contract is such that the investors should
provide liquidity as long as " " "#. However, at date 1, the maximum pledgeable income
the investors can obtain is a. They are not willing to provide liquidity if " > a. The
conflict of interest between ex-ante and ex-post decisions of the investors results in a
need for firms to hedge against the shortage of liquidity ex-post.
In this paper, however, we assume that the investors have all the bargaining power,
thus the conflict of interest between ex-ante and ex-post decisions of the investors no
longer exist. The problem faced by the investors is actually a real option problem. Any
hedging policies would reduce the option value. With this assumption, we can focus
the discussion on how firms should be structured to deal with liquidity shocks. In the
following, we will show that our results on organizational design are robust even if we
consider a competitive capital market where managers have all the bargaining power.
15See Chapter 5 in Tirole [11]
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1.5.3 Competitive Capital Market
In a competitive capital market, the manager maximizes his profit subject to the in-
vestors’ break-even constraint. The break-even constraint is such that the expected
pledgeable income for the investors is equal to their initial investment, i.e., PI = I.
This break-even constraint ensures that the manager obtains the total profit of the
project. In this case, the manager wants to continue the project as long as its shock is
not greater than the total continuation value PR as the first-best. However, this optimal
solution is not attainable if this continuation condition violates the investors’ break-even
constraint.
We study the maximum investment that the investors can provide, which is equal to the
maximum pledgeable income that they can obtain. In our initial setup, we minimize
the rents to the managers and maximize the income to the investors. In other words,
we have already obtained the maximum pledgeable income for the investors. Hence, the
maximum investment per project that the investors can provide is PIs in the case of
two small firms, and PIb in the case of one big firm.
First, consider the case where PIs < I " PIb. The projects can only be initiated if
they are managed within the same firm. In this case, the maximum investment PIb that
can be provided by the investors is strictly greater than the required investment. The
maximum shock that can be withstood is b when the investors obtain the maximum
pledgeable income PIb. However, in a competitive capital market we need to maximize
the total value of the projects, thus the pledgeable income for the investors is reduced to
the initial investment by increasing the maximum shock that can be withstood. Denote





"f(")d"! I = 0. (1.17)
We can show that b < "$ " PR.
Second, consider the case where PIs # I. The projects are always initiated regardless
of organizational structure. In this case, ex-ante credit rationing is not a concern.
Similarly, in a competitive capital market, to maximize the total profit of the projects,
the investors break even and the pledgeable income for them is less than the maximum
one. Thus, the maximum shock that can be withstood is greater than that in the case
where the investors have all the bargaining power.
Even though firms can withstand larger shocks in a competitive capital market than in
our initial case, the main conclusion that big firms can better deal with the ex-ante credit
rationing problem is still robust. In addition, that the advantage in relaxing financial
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constraints does not indicate big firms create value is also robust in a competitive capital
market. In the following, I will illustrate this point through a simple example.
Consider the case where the shock can either be 0 or $ with equal probability. Assume
that a < 2I < b and 2(b ! I) < $ < max{3b ! 4I, PR}, implying that the two projects
must be liquidated when both encounter the shocks.16 If the two projects are operated
within a big firm at period 0, the projects are either continued or liquidated together
with equal probability. The total expected payo! is PR ! 2I. If the two projects are
operated in two small firms at period 0, the two shocks are independent. Hence, the
projects are continued together except the case where both are hit by shocks. The
probability of continuation per project is 34 . The probability of liquidity injection per




2$ ! 2I. It is easy to see that
the expected payo! in the case of two small firms is larger than that in the case of one
big firm. Thus, big firms destroy value. In this case, managers prefer small firms.
1.5.4 The cost of changing management
In our basic setup, the two projects are always merged if they are continued together
at period 1. It is impossible to have two small firms coexist after the shocks. One way
to address this problem is to assume a fixed cost C of changing the management. If
the two projects are operated within a big firm, the manager stays the same at di!erent
periods. Hence, the introduction of the cost of changing management has no impact on
the results in this case. However, if the two projects are operated in two separate small
firms, the manager of one project is changed after the ex-post merger. In the following,
we study the continuation and liquidation decisions.
If C # 2(b ! a), the cost of changing the management is higher than the gain of the
pledgeable income from the ex-post merger. The two small firms would never be merged
at period 1. Each project is continued if and only if its shock is lower than a and two
small firms coexist after the shocks.
If C < 2(b ! a), the cost is lower than the gain. At period 1, the pledgeable income
that the investors can obtain from the ex-post merger is scaled down to 2b ! C. The
optimal continuation and liquidation decision is that i) continue and merge both projects
16In the case of one big firm, both projects are either hit by a shock together or not with equal
probability. If the investors withstand the shocks, their maximum profit is 2(b " 12" " I). When
" > 2(b"I), the break-even constraint is violated. In this case, the two projects are liquidated when both
are hit by shocks. In the case of two small firms, the two shocks are independent. If the investors absorb
shocks in all situations, their maximum profit is 2(b" 12""I). If the investors absorb shocks only when one






2""2I . If the investors absorb









When a < 2I < b and 2(b" I) < " < max{3b" 4I, PR}, only the intermediate case does not violate the
investors’ break-even constraint. As a result, the projects are liquidated when both are hit by shocks.
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if "A, "B " c!C and "A + "B " 2b!C; ii) continue project i and liquidate project !i
if "i " a and "!i > c ! C (i = A,B); or iii) liquidate both if "A + "B > 2b ! C and
"A, "B > a.
We can see that, due to the additional cost in changing the management, small firms
become less able to exploit the cross-pledging benefit. This reduces the probability of
continuation and the pledgeable income to the investors. Hence, the ability for small
firms to relax financial constraints is deteriorated with the introduction of this additional
cost. The conclusion, that big firms are better at relaxing the initial financial constraint,
is always robust. Furthermore, the conclusion that relaxing financial constraints for big
firms does not imply they create value is still robust, as long as the cost of switching the
management is small. In this case, the comparable advantage of small firms in dealing
with ex-post ine"cient liquidation still dominates.
1.5.5 Endogenous Investment
Our previous analysis focuses on the fixed investment model. In this subsection, we
extend the analysis to the endogenous investment case and study the robustness of our
results. We assume a convex investment cost function for each project c(I), where c
is continuous and twice di!erentiable, satisfying the monotonicity and the convexity
conditions c$ > 0 and c$$ > 0.17 The follow-up shocks, payo!s and private benefits are
scaled at per unit of investment. The optimal investment must be such that its marginal
cost is equal to its marginal benefit to the investors.
With moral hazard, the optimal investment per project in the case of two small firms is
c$(I) = q1b+ q2a! E". (1.18)
while in the case of one big firm, the optimal investment per project is







The larger the benefit to the investors, the more they are willing to invest in the project
at the initial stage. Since
" b
0 F (")d" > q1b + q2a ! E", big firms always generate a
larger marginal benefit to the investors than small firms. Therefore, large firms are
better at increasing initial investment than small firms. In other words, big firms are
better at mitigating ex-ante credit rationing than small firms. In the fixed investment
case, the advantage of big firms in mitigating ex-ante credit rationing is reflected in
17As explained in footnote 5, it is not appealing to use the variable investment model. In order to
generate a reasonable investment, we assume a convex cost function of investment.
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that projects are more likely to be initiated. In the endogenous investment case, it is
reflected in that projects have larger scales in big firms. With respect to the ex-post
ine"cient liquidation, the results are quite similar to the fixed investment case, due to
the fact that the follow-up shocks, payo!s and private benefits are scaled at per unit of
investment.
1.5.6 Ex-post Increasing Returns to Scale
In this paper, another important element driving our results is the ex-post cross-pledging
benefit, i.e., the incentive rent to the manager is reduced by merging the two projects
at period 1. Hence, the pledgeable income to the investors at date 1 is increasing and
convex in the number of viable projects. Due to the convexity, the increase in the
correlation across projects in big firms helps exploit this cross-pledging benefit and thus
relaxes financial constraint.
In addition to cross pledging, our results are robust with other types of ex-post increasing
return to scale, such as economies of scale, market power, complementarity in research
and technology. The idea is that with these positive synergies, mergers at period 1 also
boost pledgeable income and thus pledgeable income is increasing and convex in the
number of viable projects. This convexity indicates that correlation is good and it helps
large firms relax more financial constraints.
In our initial setup, for simplicity we assume that at date 2, projects are only subject
to project-specific shocks. In reality, projects may also be subject to manager-specific
shocks date 2. Our results are still robust in this case. The idea is that when projects
are subject to both project-specific and manager-specific shocks, their final payo! are
not perfectly correlated when they merged. In this case, cross-pledging benefit always
exists.
1.6 Empirical Implications
The first implication characterizes the relationship between the managerial compensation
and the number of projects the manager operates. Proposition 1.2 can be easily extended
to the case with more than two projects. Thus we have the following implication.
IMPLICATION 1: The managerial compensation is more convex in performance if the
manager has more projects under his management.
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The convexity of the managerial compensation can be reflected in the use of equity
and options in a manager’s compensation package. Hence, we expect more diversified
firms use more equity or options to reward managers. May [52] finds a positive relation
between firm diversification and the proportion of personal wealth vested in firm equity,
while Denis et al. [53] find a negative relation between the two. As argued in Aggarwal
and Samwick [54], these two tests are misleading since they treat the level of managerial
incentives as exogenously determined. Aggarwal and Samwick [54] use a setup where
incentives are set in equilibrium and find a significant positive relation. They show that
the negative relation in Denis et al. [53] is the result of unobserved, firm-specific factors.
We see the same positive association between the convexity of managerial compensation
and firm diversification. However, according to our setup, this positive relation should
be more significant when the credit constraint is the main concern. Hence, one possible
way to distinguish our hypothesis from others is to investigate how this relation changes
with the financial constraint.
The second implication characterizes the relationship between organizational structure
and the correlation of liquidity shocks. We know that, if the two projects are within
the same firm, they are subject to common manager-specific shocks, thus their liquidity
shocks become more correlated than if they are in two separate firms.
IMPLICATION 2: The correlation of external financing needs across projects is larger
if they are within the same firm than in two separate small firms.
To our knowledge, this implication has not been directly tested yet. However, this
implication is indirectly confirmed by some other empirical observations.
Bringing multiple projects under the same roof increases the correlation across projects
and therefore enhances the aggregate volatility. In other words, the distribution of firm
size matters for the level of aggregate volatility. If the ratio of large firms relative to
small ones in society increases, the aggregate volatility goes up. Gabaix [6] shows that
when the distribution of firm size is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms
do not average out. He finds that the idiosyncratic shocks of the largest 100 firms in the
United States can explain about one-third of aggregate shocks in output growth. This
empirical observation is consistent with implication 2.
Based on Proposition 1.6, we have the following implication.
IMPLICATION 3: Putting projects under the same roof can relax more financial con-
straints than in separate firms.
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The relaxation of financial constraints may be reflected in di!erent ways. Berger and
Ofek [1] find that conglomerates are significantly more leveraged than their comparable
stand-alone firms. In contrast, Comment and Jarrell [55] find no significant association
between leverage and firm diversification. These mixed observations do not necessarily
indicate that conglomerates have no advantage in relaxing the financial constraint. In
fact, relaxing financial constraints may be reflected in the reduction in the cost of capital
rather than the increase in the leverage. Hann et al. [3] find that, on average, conglom-
erates have a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of stand-alone firms. In
addition, the benefit of conglomerates may be more evident in the environment where
credit rationing is the main concern for the firm as in our setup. Kuppuswamy and Vil-
lalonga [4] treat the 2007!2009 crisis as an exogenous shock of credit rationing for firms
and find that conglomerates have significantly lower cash ratios, better credit ratings,
and are more leveraged relative to comparable focused firms.
The traditional theory attributes the advantage of conglomerates in relaxing financial
constraints to diversification. However, bringing di!erent projects under the same roof
does not imply more “diversification” than in several separate firms. If one conglomerate
can generate more or at least equal diversification than two stand-alone firms, large firms
cannot explain aggregate volatility at all, which contradicts the observation in Gabaix
[6]. Our theory argues that correlation is the reason why putting projects within a firm
can better relax financial constraints than in separate firms. In order to identify this
mechanism, we need to test the following implication.
IMPLICATION 4: Market value of the firm increases with the correlation of future
external financing needs across projects.
To our knowledge, this implication has not been tested either. To test this implication,
we need to measure external financing needs of di!erent projects. According to Rajan
and Zingales [56], external finance need is defined as capital expenditures minus cash
flows from operations divided by capital expenditures. Since 1978, the SEC in the
United States required public firms to disclose accounting data for their main business
lines. Hence, we can test how the market value of the firm relates to the correlation
of external financing needs across di!erent business lines. According to our theory, we
should observe a positive relation between the two and this relation should be more
significant in a financial constraint environment.
The next implication states the relationship between organizational structure and total
value.
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IMPLICATION 5: When credit constraint is the main concern, putting projects within
the same firm can create value. However, when credit constraint is not an issue, putting
projects within the same firm can destroy value if the ratio of small manager-specific
(firm-specific) shocks to big ones is su!ciently large.
This implication is consistent with the dramatic reversal in the empirical view towards
conglomerate mergers; positive during the 1960s and 1970s while negative in the 1980s
and 1990s. Bhide [17] argues that due to technological, economic and regulatory changes
during 1970s and 1980s, information asymmetries become less of an issue in corporate
financing. Hence, credit constraint is a significant concern for firms during the 1960s and
1970s. Our theory predicts that conglomerates can create value in a credit constrained
environment, which is consistent with the positive view towards conglomerate mergers
during this period. Credit constraint, however, becomes less important in the 1980s
and 1990s. Our theory implies that conglomerate mergers are more likely destroy value
if the likelihood of small shocks to big ones is su"ciently large. During this period,
the increased competition in the managerial labor market (Murphy and Zabojnik [18])
and the improvement in CEO education (Palia [19]) would reduce the likelihood of big
manager-specific shocks. In this context, my model predicts that conglomerate mergers
are more likely to destroy value, which is consistent with the negative view during this
period.
1.7 Conclusion
That bringing multiple projects under the same roof relaxes financial constraints has
been empirically well documented. The conventional wisdom, at least since Lewellen
[5], is that bringing projects within a firm generates more financial leeway because
of diversification. By putting several projects under the same top manager, however,
large firms can increase their correlation by exposing them to the same manager-specific
shock. I challenge the conventional wisdom and show that this positive correlation
enhances projects’ ability to obtain outside financing. In addition, by taking account
of manager-specific shocks, our theory predicts that when credit rationing is the main
concern, putting projects within the same firm always creates value. However, when
credit rationing is not an issue, whether it creates or destroys value depends on the
distribution of manager-specific shock. It is more likely to destroy value if the likelihood
of small shocks relative to large ones increases. These predictions fit quite well with
the parallel evolution of the managerial labor market and the empirical view toward
conglomerate mergers from the 1960s to the 1990s in the US.
Chapter 2
Optimal Financial Contracting in
Strategic Alliances
2.1 Introduction
Strategic alliance has become an increasingly common and favorable vehicle for com-
panies to speed up innovation in recent decades. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the
number of newly established strategic alliances each year increases dramatically in the
past twenty years, from almost 0 at year 1985 to around 2800 at year 2005. The pop-
ularity of strategic alliances draws extensive attention from economists, whose research
mainly focused on the specific investment or hold-up problem.1 Baker et al. [62], how-
ever, find that rather than the hold-up problem, the externalities generated by the joint
project on the parent firms are the main issue emphasized by practitioners. External-
ities can stem from many sources, e.g., product market competition between the two
products, knowledge transfers, cross-market synergies and etc. These spillover e!ects
are important considerations when firms decide to form and structure strategic alliances.
We use an optimal contracting approach to study the development of an innovative
product through strategic alliance by an entrepreneur and an incumbent. This innovative
product generates externalities on the existing product of the incumbent. The main
aim of the present paper is to study how the externalities a!ect the optimal financial
contracting of alliances. We consider a reduced form of externalities as in Hellmann [63].
In the model, both the entrepreneur and the incumbent privately exert e!ort, which
determines the probability of success of the innovation. With double moral hazard, the
total output is a!ected by the e!orts of both agents while we only observe the final
output. In order to deal with the free riding problem, we need an outside investor to be
1See Aghion and Tirole [59], Elfenbein and Lerner [60] and Malmendier and Lerner [61].
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a budget breaker as in Holmstrom [64] to punish both agents. In addition to e!ort, the
development of the innovation product also requires financial investment.
The entrepreneur only has limited endowment, thus he needs to obtain financing from
the incumbent and the outside investor. In standard models, an increase in the en-
trepreneur’s endowment would relax his financial constraint. This argument, however,
does not always hold if the innovation generates externalities on the financier, i.e., the
incumbent in the present paper. With the externalities, the development of the innova-
tion a!ects the profit of the incumbent even when the incumbent does not participate
in the strategic alliance. The impact of the endowment on the financing constraint also
depends on how the endowment a!ects this outside option value. If the success of the
innovation harms the incumbent, an increase in the entrepreneur’s endowment deterio-
rates the incumbent’s outside option. This loosens his participation constraint, which
increases the positive impact in relaxing financial constraints of an increase in endow-
ment. In contrast, if the success of the innovation benefits the incumbent, an increase
in the endowment raises the incumbent’s outside option. This tightens his participa-
tion constraint, which reduces and can sometimes o!set the positive e!ect in relaxing
financial constraints of an increase in endowment. The o!setting scenario happens if the
marginal e!ect of the endowment on the incumbent’s outside option is greater than 1.
The incumbent can not only contribute initial investment but also provide e!ort, as the
venture capitalist in Casamatta [65]. One main result in her paper is that financing and
advising must go hand in hand. In contrast, in the present paper, financing does not
need go hand in hand with advising for the incumbent. The intuition is that, in this
paper, the incumbent and the outside investor are deep-pocket, thus they have flexibility
in making transfers ex-post between them. This ex-post flexibility in making transfers
ensures that the identity of the agent providing the outside financing ex-ante is irrelevant
for value. This result is consistent with the empirical observation of Robinson and Stuart
[57] that up-front payments from pharmaceutical firms to biotechnology R&D firms are
sometimes not requested.
In addition to the financial investment, the e!orts of the entrepreneur and the incumbent
also are important inputs to produce the innovative product. To induce e!ort, both
the entrepreneur and the incumbent must be given proper incentives through cash-flow
rights over the total income generated by the innovation. The total income includes not
only the revenue in the entrepreneur firm but also external e!ects on the incumbent
firm. Therefore, the cash flow rights should be also contingent on the externalities.
The optimal cash-flow rights can be implemented by granting proper financial claims
to di!erent agents. In order to generate more realistic financial claims, we impose a
monotonicity constraint, i.e., the revenue of each agent must be nondecreasing in the
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Newly established alliances per year (1985-2005)































Figure 2.1: Number of newly established alliances(source: the second state of alliance
management study (2007) in association of strategic alliance professionals)
firm’s profit, as in Innes [66]. The monotonicity constraint ensures that the entrepreneur
or the incumbent has no incentive to revise their profit reports upward with hidden
borrowing. With the monotonicity constraint, the outside investor works as a budget
breaker if and only if the externality is negative, in which case the outside investor is
able to obtain a higher payo! in case of failure through a claim on the incumbent firm.
If the externality is negative, i.e., the success of the innovation harms the incumbent,
the revenue di!erence between the two states is positive in the entrepreneur firm while
negative in the incumbent firm. The e!ort of each agent is only determined by his revenue
di!erence between the two states. Thus, with a negative externality, the revenue in the
entrepreneur firm is su"cient to incentivize the entrepreneur while the revenue in the
incumbent firm cannot induce e!ort from the incumbent. In this case, the incumbent
must hold preferred equity or equity in the entrepreneur firm while not the reverse.
If the externality is positive but not very large, the incumbent can be induced to exert
some e!ort with the revenue in his own firm but not enough. Hence, as before, to
align incentives, the incumbent own equity or preferred equity in the entrepreneur firm.
In contrast, if the positive externality is very large, the incumbent can be incentivized
through a claim in his own firm while the entrepreneur cannot exert su"cient e!ort
given the revenue in her own firm. In this case, the entrepreneur must hold equity in the
incumbent firm while the incumbent holds either debt or nothing in the entrepreneur
firm.
The specific financial instruments for the incumbent holding in the entrepreneur firm
are determined by the amount of investment contributed by the entrepreneur. With
Chapter 2. Optimal Financial Contracting in Strategic Alliances 33
the same expected final income, equity provides more powerful incentives than preferred
equity, while debt does not provide any incentives. If the entrepreneur contributes a
large amount of initial investment, the incumbent’s investment will be small, so is his
expected income. In order to induce enough e!ort, the incumbent must be given higher-
powered incentives. Thus, he is granted either equity or nothing in the incumbent firm
depending on the magnitude of externality. If the entrepreneur provides a small amount
of investment, the incumbent’s contribution will be large, so is his expected income. In
this case, if the incumbent is given equity, this would make him exert too much e!ort.
Therefore, in order to recoup his investment without distorting incentives, the incumbent
must be granted preferred equity or debt depending on the magnitude of externality.
The above results rationalize the use of preferred equity in the entrepreneur firm for
the incumbent, which is consistent with the empirical observations in corporate venture
capital contracts by Cumming [67] and in biotech strategic alliances by Robinson and
Stuart [57]. Meanwhile, comparing with venture capital contracts in Casamatta [65],
pure debt securities are more likely to occur if the innovation generates externalities.
It is because with a positive externality, the incumbent is already incentivized to some
extent given a claim on his own firm and only needs to hold securities which provides
less powerful incentives, such as debt, in the entrepreneur firm. This phenomenon is
also evidenced by Cumming [67]. He finds that Canadian corporate venture capitalists
are more likely to use non-convertible debt than Canadian limited partnership venture
capitalists.
In addition, if the entrepreneur is more financially constrained, reciprocal holdings be-
tween firms are less popular, and it is usually the case for the incumbent to hold equity
in the entrepreneur firm while not the reverse. In general, small firms are more finan-
cially constrained while big firms are less financially constrained.2 It implies that, if the
strategic alliance is formed by one small firm and one big firm, it is common for the
big established firm to hold equity in the small entrepreneur firm, which is consistent
with the observation in the United States (Allen and Philips [69]). In contrast, if the
strategic alliance is formed by two big firms, cross holdings between the two are more
common, which is in line with the phenomenon of financial keiretsu in Japan, whose
main features are extensive inter-firm trading and cross-holdings of debt and equity.
Our study also sheds light on the optimal organizational structure of innovation. The
innovation can be operated either by the entrepreneur alone, through strategic alliance
or within the incumbent by hiring the entrepreneur. Strategic alliances always dominate
stand-alone operations, since they benefit from i) joint e!ort support; ii) internalization
2Internal capital market, such as Gertner et al. [25], Stein [26] and Stein [68], indicates that big firms
are less financially constrained.
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of the externality. In addition, comparing with innovating within the incumbent, strate-
gic alliance is better in case of negative externality, since the intervention of a budget
breaker only exists if the entrepreneur and the incumbent are separate entities. The
two structures, however, are indi!erent in case of positive externality, since the role of a
budget breaker is ruled out. It predicts that on average, agents are less incentivized to
do the innovation within the incumbent, which is consistent with the finding of Seru [70]
that firms acquired in mergers are less innovative, and the acquirers move R&D activity
outside the boundary of the firm via the use of strategic alliances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model. Section 3 studies the stand-alone case. Section 4 analyzes the strategic alliance
case. Section 5 focuses on how to implement the optimal contract in strategic alliance
by proper financial claims. Section 6 sheds new light on the optimal organizational
structure of innovation. Section 7 concludes. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
There are three players: an entrepreneur, an incumbent and an outside investor. The
entrepreneur, with an endowment EA, has an innovative idea to develop a new product
and is protected by limited liability. The incumbent has a mature product with a revenue
Y . Both the incumbent and the outside investor are deep-pocket. All three players are
risk neutral.
We consider a two period model, t = 0, 1. The new product requires an initial investment
I at date 0. After the investment, the innovation is operated either by the entrepreneur
alone or through strategic alliance by the entrepreneur and the incumbent. At date 1,
the innovation matures, delivering a revenue to the entrepreneur and an externality to
the incumbent. Both the revenue of the entrepreneur and the externality a!ecting the
incumbent depend on the actions of the players. When the project is operated by the
entrepreneur alone, it succeeds with probability a % [0, 1], in which case it generates
revenue Rsu for the entrepreneur and externality Y
s
u for the incumbent, and it fails with
probability 1 ! a, generating Rsd for the entrepreneur and Y
s
d for the incumbent. The
probability of success is a!ected by the e!ort of the entrepreneur. For simplicity, a is
both the probability of success and the level of e!ort. When the project is operated
with a strategic alliance, the probability of success is min{a+ b, 1}, where b is the e!ort
of the incumbent. In addition, the revenues and externalities are Ru, Rd, Yu and Yd.
The externalities are a reduced form of potentially very complicated interactions between
the entrepreneur and the incumbent, including product market competition, licensing,
Chapter 2. Optimal Financial Contracting in Strategic Alliances 35
acquisitions and so on. This reduced form consideration of externalities is similar to that
in Hellmann [63]. In this paper, we focus our analysis on how the externalities a!ect the
optimal financial contract.
We allow the revenues and externalities to be di!erent if the innovation is operated by
the entrepreneur alone v.s. through strategic alliance. This is because, through strategic
alliance, the interaction between firms can change the payo! structure. For example,
the entrepreneur may need to design the new product to be more compatible with the
existing product of the incumbent, the incumbent may expropriate the entrepreneur
ex-post after he gains access to the new technology, or both can benefit the knowledge
spillover. If Y su ! Y sd > 0 (Yu ! Yd > 0), the innovation generates a positive externality
on the incumbent in case of stand-alone operation (strategic alliance). Otherwise, the
innovation generates a negative externality.
Both e!orts are costly. CA(a) and CB(b) denote the entrepreneur’s and the incumbent’s










The interest rate is normalized to zero. In addition, 0 < A < B, indicating that the
entrepreneur is more e"cient in developing this new product than the incumbent.3
This setup is similar to the model in Casamatta [65], but it departs from it in two crucial
aspects. First, in Casamatta [65], the venture capitalist only cares about the financial
returns. In contrast, in the present paper, due to externalities, the incumbent also takes
account of the strategic consequences of the innovation on his own business. Second, in
Casamatta [65], the outside investor only provides initial funding, but, in the present
model, the outside investor also serves as a budget breaker, which is key for incentives
as in Holmstrom [64].
2.3 Stand-alone Operation
We first study the financial contracting in the stand-alone case where the entrepreneur
develops the new product alone without the help from the incumbent.
3Lerner et al. [71] find that strategic alliances, which assign less control rights to R&D firms and
more control rights to the big established firm, are signficantly less successful. This result is consistent
with our assumption that the entrepreneur firm is more e"cient in producing the product.
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2.3.1 No Moral Hazard
In the case without moral hazard, the entrepreneur’s e!ort is observable and the value
of this innovation to the entrepreneur is
V (a) = aRsu + (1! a)Rsd !
1
2
Aa2 ! I. (2.3)





Assume that Rsu ! Rsd < A, to ensure that the optimal level of e!ort has an internal
solution.




(Rsu !Rsd)2 ! I. (2.5)








With moral hazard, the entrepreneur’s e!ort is not observable. At date 0, the en-
trepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it o!er to the outside investor. The contract speci-
fies: i) the initial investment IA and Io from the entrepreneur and the outside investor
respectively, where IA + Io = I; ii) the split of final payo! at date 1: RAi to the en-
trepreneur and Rsi !RAi to the outside investor in state i, where i = u, d.
The entrepreneur chooses his e!ort level to maximize his expected utility. His incentive
compatibility constraint (ICsA) is
a % argmax
a
aRAu + (1! a)RAd !
1
2
Aa2 ! IA, (2.7)




(RAu !RAd ). (2.8)
E!ort a is increasing in the revenue di!erence between the two states. In our two-state
setup, the entrepreneur can increase the probability of success by exerting more e!ort.
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Hence, if the entrepreneur is granted more revenue in case of success relative to failure,
he has incentive to exert more e!ort.
In order to ensure that the outside investor is willing to participate in the innovation,
he must be granted a nonnegative profit. His participation constraint (PCso) is
a(Rsu !RAu ) + (1! a)(Rsd !R
A
d )! Io # 0. (2.9)
The constract is chosen to maximize the entrepreneur’s profit, given his incentive con-
straint, the participation constraint of the outside investor and other feasibility con-

















where the last condition is the feasibility constraints reflecting the limited liability pro-
tection for the entrepreneur.





2 > I, which implies that it is always profitable for the
entrepreneur to do the innovation as long as EA # 0.
Proposition 2.1.
If EA # I!Rsd, the entrepreneur exerts the same level of e!ort as without moral hazard.
In the optimal contract, the outside investor holds safe debt with face value not greater
than Rsd and the entrepreneur holds the equity.
If EA < I ! Rsd, the entrepreneur exerts less e!ort than that in the case without moral
hazard. In the optimal contract, the outside investor holds risky debt with face value
greater than Rsd and the entrepreneur holds the equity.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. According to equation (2.8), the e!ort level
of the entrepreneur is determined by his revenue di!erence between the two states. If
the entrepreneur has enough endowment, i.e., EA # I ! Rsd, the outside investor only
needs to invest I!EA, which is less than Rsd. Thus, the outside investor is granted a safe
debt with face value lower than Rsd. In this case, the equity held by the entrepreneur
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delivers him a revenue di!erence Rsu ! Rsd, leading to the same e!ort level as the case
without moral hazard. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur is financially constrained,
i.e., EA < I!Rsd, the outside investor contributes an investment I!EA, which is larger
than Rsd. He can only recoup it back by holding a risky debt with face value greater than
Rsd. In this case, the equity held by the entrepreneur would generate a revenue di!erence
lower than Rsu !Rsd, resulting in less e!ort than the case without moral hazard.
In the stand-alone case, the incumbent passively receives the externality of the innova-





























If Y su ! Y sd < 0, i.e., the innovation generates a negative externality, the value to the
incumbent is a decreasing function of the entrepreneur’s financing strength EA; if Y su !
Y sd > 0, i.e., the innovation generates a positive externality, the value to the incumbent
is an increasing function of the entrepreneur’s financing strength EA. This is intuitive.
With a negative externality, successful innovations impose costs on the incumbent. Thus,
the incumbent would prefer the entrepreneur to be financially weak so as to reduce the
probability of success. Otherwise, the reverse holds.
2.4 Strategic Alliance
In this section, we turn to the case of strategic alliance through which both the en-
trepreneur and the incumbent exert e!ort to develop the new product.
2.4.1 No Moral Hazard
We first consider the benchmark case where e!orts are observable and contractible, and
externalities are internalized. The total income generated by the innovation is Ru + Yu
in case of success and Rd + Yd in case of failure.
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The expected total income of the innovation is


















[(Ru !Rd) + (Yu ! Yd)] . (2.15)
Assume that 0 < (Ru ! Rd) + (Yu ! Yd) < ABA+B , so the e!orts are always positive, and
min{a+ b, 1} " 1 is not binding at first best. Note that the e!ort of the entrepreneur is
more e"cient than the e!ort of the incumbent, the optimal level of e!ort a# is greater
than b#. In addition, both optimal levels of e!ort are determined by not only the revenue
di!erence in the entrepreneur firm but also the externality di!erence in the incumbent
firm. If the innovation has a positive external e!ect on the incumbent firm, the success
of the innovation can benefit both firms. In this case, both the entrepreneur and the
incumbent would like to exert more e!ort than the case of negative external e!ect.
The expected total value of the innovation is









) [(Ru !Rd) + (Yu ! Yd)]2 ! I. (2.16)
Assume that









) [(Ru !Rd) + (Yu ! Yd)]2 , (2.17)
so that the project is profitable in the case without moral hazard.
In the case without moral hazard, e!orts a and b must be provided by the entrepreneur
and the incumbent respectively. However, regarding the initial investment I, the identity
of the financing agent is irrelevant for value. The same total value can be attained no
matter whether the outside investor, the incumbent, or the entrepreneur himself provides
the financial investment. Thus, the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds. However, the
results are quite di!erent in the case with moral hazard.
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2.4.2 Moral Hazard
In the case with moral hazard, both the entrepreneur’s and the incumbent’s e!orts
are unobservable. At date 0, the entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it o!er to the
incumbent and the outside investor,4 which specifies: i) the initial investment IA, IB
and Io from the entrepreneur, the incumbent and the outside investor respectively, where
IA + IB + Io = I; ii) the split of total final payo! Ri + Yi of both the entrepreneur and
incumbent firm: RAi , R
B
i and Ri + Yi ! RAi ! RBi to the entrepreneur, the incumbent
and the outside investor respectively at state i, where i = u, d.
Contrary to the case without moral hazard, the way the cash flow is shared determines
how much e!ort is provided by each agent. For the entrepreneur, the level of e!ort is
given by his incentive compatibility constraint ICA.
a % argmax
a
(a+ b)RAu + (1! (a+ b))RAd !
1
2
Aa2 ! IA, (2.18)
which means that the entrepreneur chooses his e!ort to maximize his expected profit,
given the contract established, his rational expectation of the e!ort level of the incum-




(a+ b)RBu + (1! (a+ b))RBd !
1
2
Bb2 ! IB . (2.19)










(RBu !RBd ). (2.21)
For each agent, the level of e!ort increases with the revenue di!erence between the two
states. Indeed, a (b) is increasing in RAu (R
B





The entrepreneur also needs to ask for financial support from the incumbent and the
outside investor. In order to make them willing to provide financing, the participation
constraints must ensure that they recoup their investment in expectation.
4This assumption simplifies our computation without altering the qualitative results. In addition,
Allen and Philips [69] find a significant increase in stock prices of the entrepreneur firm while not for
the incumbent firm when they form strategic alliances, which indicates that all the benefit goes to the
entrepreneur firm. This observation is consistent with our assumption.
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The participation constraint for the incumbent PCB is





Bb2 ! IB # UB . (2.22)
The left hand side represents the expected profit of the incumbent in the case of strategic
alliance. The right hand side represents the reservation utility the incumbent obtains in
the case of stand-alone operation. Note that UB is endogenous, since it depends on the
action of the entrepreneur in the case of stand-alone operation.
The participation constraint for the outside investor PCo is
!Io+Rd + Yd !RAd !RBd
+ (a+ b)
&






The reservation income for the outside investor is 0.
The financial contract is chosen to maximize the expected profit of the entrepreneur given

























Denote U = RAu !RAd and V = R
B
u !RBd . The program can be written as
max
U,V












V 2 " I " UB (2.25)








)(Ru "Rd + Yu " Yd " U)"
1
2B
V 2 " UB ! I " EA, (1)
RAd , U ! 0. (2)





2!UB = Ī , which ensures that
the entrepreneur obtains a nonnegative profit given the e!ort levels as the case without
moral hazard.
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2.4.2.1 Provision of Financing and E!ort
In the case without moral hazard, the financing and e!ort provisions are separated. The
value of the innovation is independent of the financial structure, i.e., the identity of
the financing agent. In contrast, under moral hazard, since the entrepreneur only has
limited endowment and is protected by limited liability, the financial structure matters
for value. The following proposition states the relationship between the value and the
financial participation of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a threshold I# = Rd + Yd ! 12B (Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2 !
UB such that the financial participation of the entrepreneur increases the value of the
innovation if I > I#, while it is neutral if I " I#.
I# represents the maximum outside investment that can be provided by the incumbent
and the outside investor together given the levels of e!ort in the case without moral
hazard. Under moral hazard, in order to induce the same e!ort from the entrepreneur
as without moral hazard, the minimum income that the entrepreneur must obtain is
Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd in case of success and 0 in case of failure. Hence, the maximum
expected income left for the incumbent and the outside investor is Rd + Yd. As the
incumbent participates in the strategic alliance, it also costs him a disutility of e!ort
1
2B (Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd)
2 and an outside option value UB. Therefore, the maximum total
expected income for the incumbent and the outside investor is Rd + Yd ! 12B (Ru !Rd +
Yu ! Yd)2 ! UB , corresponding to their maximum investment.
If the initial investment is small (I " I#), the project can be entirely financed by outside
capital. The financial participation of the entrepreneur is neutral for incentives and hence
for value. If the initial investment is large (I > I#), in order to preserve the incentives
for the entrepreneur and the incumbent, the financing provided by the entrepreneur
cannot be lower than I ! I#. Otherwise, the incentives are distorted and the value of
the innovation is reduced. The next proposition states in detail the relationship between
the entrepreneur’s endowment and the e!ort choices of both agents.
Proposition 2.3. In the case where I > I#, the entrepreneur and the incumbent exert
the same e!ort as without moral hazard if EA # I ! I#, otherwise, both exert less e!ort
than without moral hazard.
In the case where I > I#, if EA # I!I#, the entrepreneur can at least contributes I!I#
amount of investment. It preserves the incentives of both agents as the case without
moral hazard. However, if EA < I ! I#, the incumbent and the outside investor must
provide financing I ! EA, which is greater than I#.
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In this case, RAd = 0. The two participation constraints are always binding. The total
outside investment is






) (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB . (2.26)
Intuitively, recouping the investment for the entrepreneur and the incumbent requires a
reduction in the entrepreneur’s stake in the innovation. According to equation (2.26),
this reduction will increase the stake for the incumbent and the outside investor but
simultaneously has a counter e!ect, i.e., reducing the probability of success. This cost is
increasing with a reduction in U . Hence, to increase the outside investment from I# to
I!EA, we should also reduce the incumbent’s stake (V ) in the innovation. Even though
a reduction in V leads to less success, it saves the e!ort cost of the incumbent. This
marginal cost saving benefit is big when V is large. As a result, both the entrepreneur’s
and the incumbent’s reduction in their stakes results in less e!ort than the case without
moral hazard.
Until now, we have illustrated that under moral hazard, the financial participation of the
entrepreneur has a crucial impact on the real decisions and the value of the innovation.
The basic intuition is that, agency costs reduce the maximum outside financing that can
be raised by the entrepreneur. In this case, his own endowment can help mitigate this
agency problem and enhance the value of innovation.The following proposition turns to
the impact of the financial participations of the incumbent and the outside investor.
Proposition 2.4. The incumbent and the outside investor must provide outside financ-
ing not smaller than I ! EA. However, the identity of the agent providing outside
financing is irrelevant for value.
The remaining financing I!EA can be provided by the incumbent, the outside investor
or both. Since the incumbent and the outside investor are deep-pocket, they can make
transfers to each other when the innovation matures. Hence, the income for the in-
cumbent in case of failure RBd can take any value. With a di!erent R
B
d , to make the
incumbent willing to participate in the strategic alliance, we just need adjust his initial
investment IB. Hence, the ex-post flexibility in making transfers between the incum-
bent and the outside investor ensures that the identity of the agent providing the outside
financing ex-ante is irrelevant for value.
This irrelevance result is in contrast to Casamatta [65]. Casamatta [65] argues that
financing and advising must go hand in hand for Venture Capitalists. However, in this
paper, financing does not need go hand in hand with advising for corporate investors.
The reason is that the incumbent and the outside investor are deep-pocket and not
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protected by limited liability ex-post. In contrast, in Casamatta [65], all agents are pro-
tected by limited liability regardless of their financial situations. The present irrelevance
result is consistent with the empirical observation of Robinson and Stuart [57] that up-
front payments from pharmaceutical firms to biotechnology R&D firms are sometimes
not requested.
As a result, the identity of the agent providing the outside financing is irrelevant while
the provision of internal financing from the entrepreneur is crucial in a!ecting the real
decisions. The entrepreneur’s endowment a!ects the real decisions through his financial
constraints. Next, we turn to study in detail the impact of the entrepreneur’s endowment
EA.
2.4.2.2 Financial Constraints
In the presence of agency problems, access to outside financing is limited by the com-
bination of the incentive and participation constraints. To measure the extent to which
the firm is financially constrained, I propose to use the shadow value of this constraint,
i.e., the lagrange multiplier of the outside investment constraint (1) in Program (2.25).
Proposition 2.5. The shadow value % satisfies
f(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 = I ! EA ! (Rd + Yd) + UB , (2.27)
where f(%, A,B) =
(1 + %)(2A2%!AB(%! 1)2(%+ 1) + 2B2%(1 + %)2)
2A(!A%2 +B(1 + 3%+ 2%2))2
, increasing in
%.
The shadow value of the outside investment constraint % reflects the conflict between
the incentives and the investment constraint. If it is more di"cult for the entrepreneur
to get an amount I ! EA of investment from the incumbent and the outside investor,
% will become larger. Hence, % actually measures the tightness of the entrepreneur’s
financial constraint.
According to equation (2.27), we can simply do comparative statics to study the impact
of di!erent parameters on the tightness of the financial constraint. Based our previous
analysis, the entrepreneur’s endowment is very important in determining the tightness
of financial constraints. In the following, we focus on the impact of the entrepreneur’s
endowment on the tightness of firms’ financial constraints.5
Proposition 2.6.
5See the impact of other parameters on # in Appendix.
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(a) Y su ! Y
s
d % 0
(b) Y su ! Y
s
d > 0
Figure 2.2: The solid depicts the outside option value UB the incumbent receives in the
case of stand-alone operation. The dashed line is the entrepreneur’s endowment EA. In (b),
the dotted line also represents the outside option value of the incumbent UB . For the dotted
line, the marginal e!ect of the endowment EA on UB is always lower than 1, while for the
solid line, this marginal e!ect is first greater than 1 and then decreases to 0.
If Y su !Y sd " 0, an increase in the endowment of the entrepreneur EA reduces the outside
option value UB and relaxes the financial constraint.
If Y su ! Y sd > 0, an increase in the endowment EA raises the incumbent’s outside option




the financial constraint is loosened.
If Y su ! Y sd " 0, the success of the innovation harms the incumbent. An increase in the
endowment leads to an increase in the probability of success in the stand-alone case.
Hence, as the endowment increases, the outside option value UB the incumbent receives
declines and he would like to provide more investment, leading to a relaxation in the
financial constraint. This is depicted in Figure 2.2(a).
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In contrast, if Y su!Y sd > 0, the outside option value UB increases with EA. The change in
the financial constraint depends on the marginal e!ect of the endowment on the outside
option value UB the incumbent receives in the stand-alone case. If this marginal e!ect is
greater than 1, the outside option value UB increases more quickly than the endowment.
In this case, the financial constraint is tightened with the endowment. Otherwise, the
financial constraint is loosened.
Corollary 2.7. When the development of the innovation has a positive external ef-
fect on the profits of the incumbent (Y su ! Y sd > 0), the financial constraint is relaxed
by an increase in the entrepreneur’s endowment if Y su ! Y sd is small, i.e. Y
s
u ! Y sd "
(
(Rsu !Rsd)2 ! 4A(I !Rsd). Otherwise, the financial constraint is tightened by an in-










4A , 0}+ I !R
s
d).
In Figure 2.2(b), the dotted line indicates the financial constraint is loosened if the
endowment goes up, since the marginal e!ect is always lower than 1. As indicated
in the Corollary 2.7, this happens when the externality that the incumbent receives
is su"ciently low. Otherwise, the financial constraint is initially tightened and then
loosened as implied in the solid line. This is because the marginal e!ect is initially
greater than 1 and eventually decreases to 0.
This result challenges the traditional view that the increase in the internal capital re-
laxes financial constraints. Our result indicates that if the firm generates externality
on the financier, the impact of the internal capital on financial constraints can be non-
monotonic. The next proposition illustrates the impact of the entrepreneur’s endowment
on e!ort.
Proposition 2.8. The entrepreneur’s e!ort and the probability of success of the inno-
vation increases with EA when
#UB
#EA
< 1, and decreases when #UB#EA > 1.
According to Program 2.25, the entrepreneur’s endowment EA a!ects the e!ort choices
only through the outside investment constraint. When #UB#EA > 1, the increase in the
endowment EA tightens the financial constraint %. The maximization program (2.25)
puts less weight on the value of innovation and more weight on the investment constraint.
Hence, we should reduce the stake for the entrepreneur to boost the outside investment.
In this case, the entrepreneur exerts less e!ort. The probability of success also declines
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when the conflict between incentives and the investment constraint becomes larger.6 On
the other hand, when #UB#EA < 1, the increase in the endowment EA loosens the financial
constraint and thereby increases the entrepreneur’s e!ort and the probability of success.
2.4.2.3 Budget Breaker
In this double moral hazard framework, both the entrepreneur’s and the incumbent’s
e!orts are unobservable. The total output is observable and determined by the e!orts
of both agents. As in Holmstrom [64], in order to deal with the free riding problem, we
need a third party to punish both agents in case of failure.
Denote W the revenue di!erence between the two states for the outside investor.
Proposition 2.9. The outside investor works as a budget breaker by obtaining a higher
payo! in case of failure than in case of success, i.e., W < 0.
In our setup, without the outside investor, the payo!s for the entrepreneur and the
incumbent must satisfy the budget constraint, i.e., U+V = Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd. However,
introducing the outside investor, we have U + V +W = Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd. It is shown
that W is optimally to be negative, thus U+V > Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd. It indicates that the
introduction of the outside investor breaks the initial budget constraint while increase
the value of the innovation. The intuition is that, the outside investor works as budget
breaker by taking more income in case of failure. In this case, both the entrepreneur
and the incumbent are punished when the innovation fails. In turn, this punishment in
case of failure will give them better incentives to exert e!ort. Hence, in our setup, the
outside investor not only work as a financier but also a budget breaker as in Holmstrom
[64].
2.5 Implementation of Optimal Financial Contracts
The objective of this section is to design financial claims to provide right incentives for
both the entrepreneur and the incumbent. To generate more realistic financial claims,
in this section we restrict our analysis to the case where the payo!s of all players are
6The probability of success is the sum of both agents’ e!ort. Hence, if the entrepreneur’s e!ort and
the probability of success are known, we can directly obtain the incumbent’s e!ort. The entrepreneur’s
e!ort is monotonic with EA given
UB
EA
> 1 or UB
EA
< 1. However, the incumbent’s e!ort may not be
monotonic, depending on the specific value of A
B
. Nevertheless, this non-monotonicity does not a!ect
the monotonic characteristics of the probability of success. Hence, we only report the result on the
entrepreneur’s e!ort and the probability of success for simplicity. The results of the incumbent’s e!ort
are in Appendix.
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constrained to be nondecreasing in the firm’s profit. As argued in Innes [66], this mono-
tonicity constraint ensures that the entrepreneur or the incumbent has no incentive to
revise their profit reports upward with hidden borrowing.
2.5.1 Monotonicity Constraint
In this subsection, we turn to study the robustness of our results given the monotonicity
constraint. To be a budget beaker, the outside investor should obtain a higher payo! in
case of failure. However, with monotonicity constraint, the payo! of each agent should
be nondecreasing in the firm’s payo!. Hence, the monotonicity constraint must have a
critical impact on the role of the outside investor as a budget breaker.
Proposition 2.10. With monotonicity constraint, the outside investor can work as a
budget breaker if Yu ! Yd < 0, otherwise, he is a pure financier.
The final outcome of the entrepreneur firm is Ru in case of success and Rd in case of
failure. Its externality on the incumbent firm is Yu and Yd respectively. The outside
investor, as a budget breaker, should obtain a higher revenue in case of failure. Since
the revenue di!erence in the entrepreneur firm is always positive, i.e., Ru ! Rd > 0,
whether the outside investor can work as a budget breaker only depends on the sign of
the externality di!erence Yu ! Yd in the incumbent firm. If the innovation generates a
positive external e!ect in the incumbent, i.e., Yu!Yd # 0, the outside investor can only
work as a pure financier without violating the monotonicity constraint. If the innovation
has a negative external e!ect, i.e., Yu!Yd < 0, the outside investor can work as a budget
breaker by granted a share in the incumbent firm.
In this case, the maximization program 2.25 should incorporate the monotonicity con-
straint as following.




Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd Yu ! Yd # 0
Ru !Rd Yu ! Yd < 0.
(2.28)
If Yu!Yd # 0, the outside investor cannot work as a budget breaker, i.e., W # 0. Hence,
U+V = Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd!W " Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd. If Yu!Yd < 0, the outside investor can
work as a budget breaker, but his revenue di!erence cannot be lower than that provided
in the incumbent firm, i.e., W # Yu!Yd. Thus, U+V = Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd!W " Ru!Rd.
With the monotonicity constraint, the incentives can be di!erent for the agents since the
total revenue they obtain in case of success exceeding in case of failure is constrained.
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However, all the propositions without the monotonicity constraint have not been qualita-
tively changed, while the quantitative results are much more complex with monotonicity
constraints. Please refer to Appendix for the detailed discussion on the robustness.
2.5.2 Financial Claims
The objective of this subsection is to study the financial claims that provide right incen-
tives for both the entrepreneur and the incumbent without violating the monotonicity
constraint. The following proposition states that the design of the financial claims de-
pends on the spillover e!ect on the incumbent.
Proposition 2.11.
1) If Yu!Yd < 0, the incumbent holds preferred equity or equity in the entrepreneur firm
while the entrepreneur does not hold equity in the incumbent firm. The outside investor
holds equity in the incumbent firm to work as a budget breaker.
2) If Yu ! Yd # 0,
2.1) If U < Ru!Rd, the entrepreneur and the incumbent hold the same type of financial
claims as in 1).7
2.2) If U # Ru !Rd, the incumbent holds debt or nothing in the entrepreneur firm, and
the entrepreneur holds equity in the incumbent firm when U > Ru ! Rd while does not
when U = Ru !Rd.
2.3) The outside investor can be excluded since he cannot be a budget breaker.
Proposition 2.11 indicates that the externality has a pivotal impact on the optimal
financial claims held by the entrepreneur and the incumbent. In the model, the level of
e!ort of each agent is determined by the revenue di!erence he receives between success
and failure. When the externality is negative, the revenue di!erence in the entrepreneur
firm Ru!Rd > 0 while that in the incumbent firm Yu!Yd < 0. In this case, the revenue
in the entrepreneur firm is su"cient to incentivize the entrepreneur while the revenue in
the incumbent firm cannot induce e!ort from the incumbent. Thus, the incumbent must
hold equity or preferred equity in the entrepreneur firm. Nevertheless, the entrepreneur
does not need to hold equity in the incumbent firm since it will dilute his incentives.
When the externality is positive, U + V = Ru ! Rd. If U < Ru ! Rd, the entrepreneur
can be still fully incentivized through a share of revenue in his own firm while it is not
the case for the incumbent. Thus, we obtain the same result as in the case of negative
7U is the optimal rent for the entrepreneur in the case with monotonicity constraint.
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externality. If U # Ru ! Rd, V " Yu ! Yd, i.e., a share of revenue in the incumbent
firm can induce su"cient e!ort from the incumbent. Hence, the incumbent holds either
debt or nothing in the entrepreneur firm. For the entrepreneur, if U > Ru!Rd, the the
revenue in the entrepreneur firm is not enough to incentivize him, thus, he should hold
equity in the incumbent firm, while not the case when U = Ru !Rd.
The specific financial instruments the incumbent hold in the entrepreneur firm, such
as preferred equity or common equity when U < Ru ! Rd, debt or nothing when U #
Ru ! Rd, depend on the total outside investment contribution from the incumbent and
the outside investor. Denote I $ as this outside investment, and I as the maximum
outside investment given the e!ort levels in the case where the entrepreneur is not
financially constrained.
To be a budget breaker, the outside investor cannot hold equity in the entrepreneur
firm, since it harms his incentives. It is possible for the outside investor to hold debt
in the entrepreneur firm. Nevertheless, this has nothing to do with incentives. Without
loss of generality, we neglect the possibility for the outside investor to hold debt in
the entrepreneur firm. The revenue in the entrepreneur firm is only shared by the
entrepreneur and the incumbent.
Proposition 2.12.
1) In the case where U < Ru ! Rd, there exists a threshold I # < I , such that if
I $ " I #, the entrepreneur holds preferred equity while the incumbent holds common
equity in the entrepreneur firm. If I $ > I #, the entrepreneur holds common equity
while the incumbent holds preferred equity in the entrepreneur firm.
2) In the case where U # Ru ! Rd, there exists another threshold I !Rd, such that if
I $ " I ! Rd, the entrepreneur holds equity while the incumbent holds nothing in the
entrepreneur firm. If I $ > I ! Rd, the entrepreneur holds equity while the incumbent
holds debt in the entrepreneur firm.
In the model, with the same expected final income, equity provides more powerful incen-
tives than preferred equity, while debt does not provide any incentives. If the amount
of outside investment is small and so is the expected income. In order to induce enough
e!ort, the incumbent must be given claims with higher-powered incentives. Thus, if
U < Ru !Rd, the incumbent is not incentivized su"ciently given the income in his own
firm and must be granted with equity in the entrepreneur firm. If U # Ru ! Rd, the
incumbent already exerts enough e!ort given the income from his own firm and does not
need to hold any claim in the entrepreneur firm. If the amount of outside financing is
large and so is the expected income. In this case where U < Ru !Rd, if the incumbent
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is given equity, this would make him exert too much e!ort. Thus, in order to recoup his
investment without distorting incentives, the incumbent must be granted with preferred
equity. Similarly, in the case where U # Ru !Rd, the incumbent should hold debt.
Proposition 2.11 and 2.12 rationalizes the use of preferred equity or convertible debt in
the entrepreneur firm for the incumbent.8 It is consistent with the empirical observation
of widely-used convertible claims in corporate venture capital contracts by Cumming
[67] and in biotech strategic alliances by Robinson and Stuart [57]. Comparing with
the results for venture capital contracts in Casamatta [65], we obtain that pure debt
securities are more likely to occur if the incumbent rather than the venture capitalist
participates in the innovation. It is because with a positive externality, the incumbent
is already incentivized to some extent given a claim in his own firm and only needs to
hold securities which provides less powerful incentives, such as debt, in the entrepreneur
firm. This phenomenon is also evidenced by Cumming [67]. He finds that Canadian
corporate venture capitalists are more likely to use non-convertible debt than Canadian
limited partnership venture capitalists.
Proposition 2.11 also implies that when the entrepreneur is more financially constrained,
his stake U is reduced. In this case, it is more common for the incumbent to hold equity in
the entrepreneur firm and not the reverse. Nevertheless, when the entrepreneur becomes
less financially constrained, reciprocal holdings between firms become more popular.
We use the firm size to indicate the tightness of its financial constraint. Generally
speaking, big firms are less financially constrained while small firms are more financially
constrained.9 In the United States, big established firms often hold equity in small
entrepreneur firms while reciprocal shareholding is very rare.10 Nevertheless, in Japan,
most big firms are a"liated with a financial keiretsu. The main features of the financial
keiretsu are extensive inter-firm trading and cross-holdings of debt and equity. Thus,
the implication of our theory is in line with the empirical observation on the di!erence
of cross-holdings among firms in the United States and Japan.
2.6 Organizational Structure
This section sheds some light on how to structure the organization to facilitate innova-
tion. The innovation can be operated either by the entrepreneur alone, through strategic
alliance or within the incumbent. The first two organizational structures have already
8In this paper, there is no di!erence between preferred equity and convertible debt, just as Casamatta
[65].
9Internal capital market, such as Gertner et al. [25], Stein [26] and Stein [68], indicates that big firms
are less financially constrained.
10See Allen and Philips [69]
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been analyzed. The third one means that the incumbent hires the entrepreneur and
develops this new product within the boundary of the incumbent.
Proposition 2.13.
If Ru = Rsu, Rd = R
s
d, Yu = Y
s
u and Yd = Y
s
d , strategic alliances always generate larger
value than stand-alone operations.
If Yu ! Yd < 0, developing innovation through strategic alliances dominates within the
incumbent. Nevertheless, if Yu ! Yd # 0, there is no di!erence for innovation between
through strategic alliances and within the incumbent.
We first compare stand-alone operations and strategic alliances. In the case with the
same payo! structure in strategic alliances and stand-alone operations, i.e., Ru = Rsu,
Rd = Rsd, Yu = Y
s
u and Yd = Y
s
d , strategic alliances generate a larger value than stand-
alone operations, since the former benefits from i) joint e!ort support; ii) internalization
of the externality. The joint e!ort support benefit of strategic alliances accords with
the resource-based explanation of strategic alliance in Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven [72]
and Das and Teng [73], which emphasizes the pooling of resources of di!erent firms to
speed up innovation or gain competitive advantage. It also has a similar spirit to the
advising role of venture capitalists in Casamatta [65], where the joint provision of e!ort
improves the productivity of an investment project. In addition, the internalization of
externalities is in line with the work of Clayton and Jorgensen [74], Gilo et al. [75],
Mathews [76], and Foros et al. [77], which argue that the partial ownership among
firms takes account of externalities and reduces ex-post competition. Despite the two
benefits for strategic alliances, it does not imply that strategic alliances always make the
innovation more successful, especially when Yu ! Yd is negative. Thus, the instability of
strategic alliances can be a misleading indicator of their failure. This theoretical result
is in line with the discussion of the di!erence between instability and failure in strategic
alliances. 11
We now turn to the comparison between innovating through strategic alliances and
within the incumbent. In both cases, the entrepreneur and the incumbent collaborate.
The di!erence is that through strategic alliances, there are two separate entities, while
within the incumbent, there is only one entity. When the innovation has a positive
external e!ect on the incumbent, monotonicity constraint precludes the intervention of
a budget breaker. Nevertheless, when the innovation has a negative external e!ect, the
intervention of a budget breaker is consistent with the monotonicity constraint, only
when the incumbent and the entrepreneur are separate entities. Therefore, the optimal
design rules out developing innovation within the incumbent if the innovation has a
11see e.g. Kogut [78], Kogut [79] and Park and Russo [80].
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negative external e!ect, while does not if the innovation has a positive external e!ect.
It predicts that, on average, agents are less incentivized to do the innovation within the
incumbent. Thus, it is less profitable to innovate within the incumbent than strategic
alliances, which is consistent with the finding of Seru [70] that firms acquired in mergers
are less innovative, and the acquirers move R&D activity outside the boundary of the




Do traders learn to avoid participating in speculative bubbles? This question is the
object of a long-standing debate in the financial economics literature. Smith et al. [81]
propose an experimental design to study speculative bubbles and show that bubbles are
less likely but do not disappear with experience. This result is confirmed by King et al.
[82]. Dufwenberg et al. [83] further show that bubbles also diminish when only part of
the traders are experienced. On the contrary, using an alternative experimental design,
Moinas and Pouget [84] show that traders’ propensity to speculate do not decrease after
several rounds of play.
The present paper studies whether traders learn to speculate in the context of the bubble
game designed by Moinas and Pouget [84]. In this game, trading proceeds sequentially,
traders’ position in the sequence is random, and prices increase exponentially. When
there is a price cap, there is no bubble at the dominance-solvable Bayesian Nash equi-
librium: confronted with the highest potential price, a rational trader refuses to buy.
Anticipating this behavior, a rational trader receiving the second highest price should
also refuse to buy. Backward induction thus rules out the formation of bubbles (the
higher the price cap, the higher the number of iterated reasoning steps needed to reach
equilibrium). However, when traders are boundedly rational, bubbles can emerge. We
study whether experience reduces the propensity to speculate.
We capture traders’ learning process using Camerer and Ho [85]’s Experience-Weighted
Attraction model. This adaptive learning model is general in the sense that it nests
belief-based learning and reinforcement learning. A crucial parameter in this model is
the imagination parameter. When it is equal to 0, agents only reinforce chosen actions,
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as it is the case in reinforcement learning. When the imagination parameter is greater
than 0, agents also reinforce actions that were not actually chosen, as it is implicitly
assumed in belief-based learning. Using Camerer and Ho [85]’s model is useful because
it enables us to study whether adaptive traders’ speculating behavior depends on the
learning process.
To obtain our result, we simulate traders’ behavior with 1,000 independent trials that
each include 1,000 successive runs. Traders’ attraction towards the various actions are
transformed into choice probabilities via a logistic function with a given payo! respon-
siveness parameter. When this parameter is 0, players choose each action with the same
probability, while when it is infinite, players choose with probability one the action with
the highest attraction.
Our results show that, in the long run, the market converges to the unique no bubble
equilibrium. This is to be expected given that the no-bubble equilibrium is unique and
dominance solvable. However, we show that learning initially increases traders’ propen-
sity to speculate. In the short run, more experienced traders thus create more bubbles.
Moreover, we show that this e!ect is stronger when traders are more sophisticated (that
is, when they have a higher degree of imagination) and when the price cap is higher. Our
results are robust if i) the exogenous price path is more or less explosive, ii) traders are
randomly assigned positions at each run, iii) price caps are di!erent, and iv) we allow
traders to choose the price at which they propose to sell.
Overall, our results reconcile the findings of the experimental literature: when a few
steps of reasoning are needed due a short experiment (in the setting of Smith et al. [81])
or to a low price cap (in the setting of Moinas and Pouget [84]), learning shuts down
speculation rapidly, in line with results of King et al. [82]. On the contrary, when a lot
of steps of reasoning are needed, learning does not reduce speculation (at least in the
short and medium run), in line with the results of Moinas and Pouget [84].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the setting
we use to study speculation. Section 3 presents the baseline results. Section 4 o!ers
robustness checks.
3.2 The bubble game and the learning model
Our baseline setting derives from Moinas and Pouget [84]. Consider a valueless financial
asset that can be traded in a sequential market. Traders are equally likely to be in each
position in the market sequence. If a trader is proposed to buy the asset, he can choose
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whether to accept or to refuse. If he refuses, trading stops. If he accepts, he proposes
to sell to the next trader. We focus on the case with three traders.
In the baseline setting, prices are exogenous. The first trader is o!ered a price 10n,
where n is random and follows a geometric distribution: P (n = j) = 12
j+1
. Each
following trader is (potentially) o!ered a price that is ten times higher than the previous
price. This setting is such that no trader can ever be sure to be last in the market
sequence despite prices revealing some information regarding traders’ position. When
rationality is common knowledge, Moinas and Pouget [84] show that, when there is a
price cap, the unique dominance solvable equilibrium involves no-trade (and thus no
bubble): at equilibrium all traders refuse to buy the asset (when there is no cap on
prices, bubbles can arise at equilibrium).
To study how speculation decisions depend on previous experiences, we consider that
traders adopt an adaptive behavior and adjust their choices according to past perfor-
mance. We capture adaptive behavior according to Camerer and Ho [85]’ Experience-
Weighted Attraction model that nests reinforcement and belief-based learning. Specifi-
cally, the attraction of action aji for agent i at time t is governed as follows.
Aji (t) =





N(t) is the experience parameter:
N(t) = "N(t! 1) + 1 (3.2)
where " is the depreciation parameter for the pervious-period experience.
In equation(3.1), # controls the depreciation of previous attractions; &(aji , a!i(t)) is the
profit for agent i to choose action aji given other agents choose action a!i(t); 1aji=ai(t)
is
an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if aji = ai(t) and 0 otherwise; when ! = 0, agent
i reinforce the profit of action aji only if it is selected at date t, while when ! > 0, agent
i reinforce the profit of action aji no matter whether it is actually chosen or not. ! is the
imagination parameter that controls how much agents are able to display counterfactual
reasoning.
According to the attraction, agent i decides the probability to choose action aji as fol-
lowing:
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where % represents the sensitivity of agents to attractions. Equation(3.3) indicates that
the probability for agent i to choose action aji is determined by its relative attraction in
the previous period.
This adaptive learning model captures both the law of actual e!ect and the law of
simulated e!ect. The law of actual e!ect means that the attraction of an action is
adjusted only if this action has been selected (! = 0). If the action generates a positive
profit, this action will be more attractive, otherwise, it will be less attractive. This law
is at the core of reinforcement learning (see, for example, Roth and Erev [86]). The law
of simulated e!ect indicates that the attraction of an action is adjusted according to the
profit it could have generated even if it has not been selected (! > 0). This law is at the
core of belief-based learning (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine [87]).
In this trading game, at any given price, traders need to determine whether to buy the
asset or not. Thus, the actions for any trader is to buy or not conditional on a price.
According to equation(3.3), the probability to buy for each trader and for a given price
P at date t+ 1 is determined by:















where ABi (t|P ) and A"i (t|P ) are the attractions for agent i of accepting or refusing to
buy respectively given price P at date t, and A"i (t|P ) = 0.
To close the system, the initial values N(0) and Aji (0) need to be specified. We set
N(0) = 1 and Aji (0) = 0. When A
j
i (0) = 0, traders initially choose each action with
the same probability. In addition, we also set " = 0 and # = 1. These parameter
values are identical to the ones used by Pouget [88]. Finally, our baseline simulations
uses a 2 ' 2 design with ! being equal to 0 or 1, and % being equal to 1 or 1,000. Our
simulation proceeds as follows: for a given set of parameters, each simulation contains
1, 000 independent trials; each trial contains 1, 000 runs, where each run represents one
trading session. For each trial, at the beginning each trader is randomly assigned a
position in the trading game and this position is fixed with all the future runs.
3.3 Adaptive traders and speculation: a simple case
In this section, we look at a simple case where the probabilities to buy for the first and
last traders are always fixed and study the speculative behavior of the second trader.
Denote the probability to buy for the first, the second and the last trader are pb, pt and
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ps respectively. The second trader is always assigned a price P . He can sell the asset at
price 10P .
3.3.1 Case 1: ! = 1
We first consider the case where ! = 1 and study the evolution of the attraction and the
probability to buy for the second trader.
At date t, with probability pbps, the first and third traders buy the asset. The second
trader gains 9P if he chooses to buy the asset. Thus, his attraction of buying the asset
at date t is
AB2 (t|P ) = AB2 (t! 1|P ) + 9P. (3.5)
With probability pb(1! ps), the first trader buys the asset while the third one does not.
The second trader gains !P if he buys the asset. Thus, his attraction of buying the
asset is
AB2 (t|P ) = AB2 (t! 1|P )! P. (3.6)
With probability 1! pb, the first trader does not buy the asset. The second trader gain
nothing if he buys the asset. Thus,
AB2 (t|P ) = AB2 (t! 1|P ). (3.7)












0, w.p. 1! pb
!P, w.p. pb(1! ps)
.
Xt represents the incremental attraction of buying at date t. Xt is i.i.d. Thus, AB2 (t|P ) =
)t
i=1Xi is a random walk.
Hence, the expected attraction of buying at date t for the second trader is




E(Xi) = Ppb(10ps ! 1)t. (3.8)
Denote µ = Ppb(10ps ! 1).
Chapter 3. Learning to Speculate 59













Figure 3.1: Volatility of pt when % = 1, ! = 1 and pb = 0.6
Proposition 3.1. If pb > 0 and ps <
1
10 , the probability to buy for the second trader pt
converges to 0 in probability. If pb > 0 and ps >
1
10 , the probability to buy for the second
trader pt converges to 1 in probability.
Proof : If pb > 0 and ps <
1
10 , the probability to buy for the second trader pt converges
to 0 in probability.
Denote X̄ = 1t
)t
i=1Xi. According to Hoe!ding’s inequality, (' > 0, we obtain that
Pr(|X̄ ! µ| # ') " 2e!
2t2!2
(10P )2t . (3.9)
In other words,
Pr(|AB2 (t|P )! µt| # 't) " 2e
! 2t
2!2
(10P )2t . (3.10)
Thus,
Pr(AB2 (t|P ) # (µ + ')t) " 2e
! 2t
2!2




(10P )2t = 0, AB2 (t|P ) converges in probability to !$. Denote f(x) =
1
1+e!"x
. f(x) is a continuous function of x. If AB2 (t|P ) converges in probability to
!$, according to continuous mapping theorem, f(AB2 (t|P )) converges in probability
to f(!$) = 0. That is, the probability to buy for the second trader converges in
probability to 0 when ps < 0.1 and pb > 0.
Proof : If pb > 0 and ps >
1
10 , the probability to buy for the second trader pt converges
to 1 in probability.
Similar to the previous case.
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If pb = 0 or ps =
1
10 , the expected attraction of buying for the second trader is always
0. However, his probability to buy does not converge to a constant in probability. This
can be seen in Figure 3.1, where the volatility of pt in this case does not converge to 0.
Proposition 3.2. If pb = 0, Et(pt+1) = pt. If pb > 0, Et(pt+1) > pt i! p# < ps " 1,







At date t, the incremental attraction of buying for the second trader have three possible


















According to equation (3.4), we can show that







Plug equation (3.13) into equation (3.12), we obtain that
Et(pt+1) = pbps
1




1 + ( 1pt ! 1)e
$P




If pb = 0, Et(pt+1) = pt.
If pb > 0, we find that
Et(pt+1)! pt = pb{ps
1




1 + ( 1pt ! 1)e
$P
! pt} > 0. (3.15)

















3.3.2 Case 2: ! = 0
In the case where ! = 0, the attraction of buying for the second trader is updated if
and only if he has chosen to buy the asset, otherwise, it will not be updated. Hence, at
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date t, the attraction of buying for the second trader is updated only with probability












0, w.p. 1! pbpt
!P, w.p. pb(1! ps)pt
.
With probability pbpspt, all the three traders choose to buy the asset, hence the second
trader obtains 9P . With probability pb(1!ps)pt, the first and the second trader buy the
asset while the last does not buy. Thus, the second trader obtains !P . With probability
1 ! pbpt, the first trader does not buy or the first trader buys but the second does not
buy, the second trader always obtains 0.
According to equation (3.4), and AB2 (t|P ) = AB2 (t ! 1|P ) +Xt, the probability to buy























. w.p. pb(1! ps)pt
(3.16)
Hence, the probability to buy for the second trader at date t+ 1 is
Et(pt+1) = pbpspt
1




1 + ( 1pt ! 1)e
$P
, (3.17)
which yield the following proposition
Proposition 3.3. If p# " ps <= 1, Et(pt+1) # pt, i.e., p1, p2, p3, ... is a submartingale.
If 0 " ps < p#, Et(pt+1) " pt, i.e., p1, p2, p3, ... is a supermartingale.
Proposition 3.4. When t ) +$, pt converges almost surely. (Converge to a random
variable rather than a constant)
Proof : Refer to Doob’s first martingale convergence theorem.
The volatility of pt for the second trader is in Figure 3.2.
According to the simulation results in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, we can see that the probability
to sell ps has an important impact on the evolution of traders’ speculation. When ps is
high, learning can lead to more speculation, since traders can benefit from it. In this
section, we use the simplest framework to analyze the mechanism under which experience
can lead to more speculation. In the following, we will come back to our general model
and try to study speculation when all traders strategically choose their actions.
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Figure 3.2: Volatility of pt when % = 1, ! = 1 and pb = 0.6



















(a) $ = 1 and pb = 0



















(b) $ = 1 and pb = 0.6



















(c) $ = 1000 and pb = 0



















(d) $ = 1000 and pb = 0.6
Figure 3.3: The probability to buy for the second trader given pb and ps: case ! = 1
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(a) $ = 1 and pb = 0



















(b) $ = 1 and pb = 0.6



















(c) $ = 1000 and pb = 0



















(d) $ = 1000 and pb = 0.6
Figure 3.4: The probability to buy for the second trader given pb and ps: case ! = 0
3.4 Adaptive traders and speculation
3.4.1 Individual trading behavior
This section presents the individual speculative behavior of our game when the price
cap is 1. Hence, the price assigned to the first, second and third trader is 1, 10 and
100 respectively. We will analyze whether and how the no bubble equilibrium can be
reached when traders learn from past experience.
We first look at the case in which ! = 1 and % = 1. Figure 3.5 depicts the probability
to buy for individuals at di!erent prices. Panel (a) refers to the case in which learning
initially leads to more speculation for the first two traders and the last trader monoton-
ically learns not to speculate. Since the last trader can never sell the asset, he cannot
gain if he chooses to buy and therefore he learns not to participate in trading this asset.
Due to lack of experience, the last trader initially chooses to buy with a high probability
(50% given the initial attractions). In this case, the second trader can sell the asset
at 10 times higher price with a high probability. He can gain from trading, thus lead-
ing to more speculation. This is consistent with the result in the previous section that
traders are more likely to speculate with a high probability to sell the asset. As time
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goes by, the last trader learns not to speculate and the second trader is then less prone
to speculate. The same pattern occurs for the first trader, the only di!erence being
that the first trader is more inclined to buy the asset due to the higher speculation of
the second trader. As a result, the convergence to no speculation is very slow for the
first trader (after 200 runs). Note that the probability to buy of the last trader does
converge to zero, since traders early in the market sequence learn not to speculate, the
last trader is very rarely o!ered the opportunity to buy (and thus to learn). Based on
our quantitative result in the previous section, we know as long as the previous trader
buys the asset with a positive probability, the trader learns not to speculate if the latter
trader chooses to buy the asset with a probability lower than 0.1, which is consistent
with our results here.
Speculative behavior changes when traders have a lower imagination (! = 0) as illus-
trated in Figure 3.5, Panel (c). When they reinforce actions that were actually chosen,
the first two traders initially learn less quickly to speculate. This is because when ini-
tially speculating can be very profitable, traders start a trial with a high tendency to
speculate. However, when ! = 0, the traders only reinforce the actual actions, and thus
they learn less to take advantage of this profit. This implies that the propensity to
speculate of the first traders reverts back to zero pretty fast. In contrast, the last trader
learns less quickly not to speculate.
An increase in traders’ responsiveness to attractions, %, reduces (but does not eliminate)
speculation when ! = 0 (see Figure 3.5, Panel (d) but has no significant e!ect when ! = 1
(see Figure 3.5, Panel b).
These results on individual behavior shed some light on the aggregate market behavior.
The first (respectively, last) traders in the market sequence initially learn to (respectively,
not to) speculate indicates that the likelihood of bubbles initially increase and then
takes some time to converge to zero. Second, imagination induces the first traders in the
market sequence to learn more strongly to speculate. This explains that, when traders
have imagination, bubbles become more frequent and more rapidly.
3.4.2 Bubble evolution
In this subsection, rather than individual trading behavior, we turn to the evolution
of bubbles when the trading game is repeated many times and traders learn from past
experience. We compute the probability that a large, medium, or small bubble arises
or that no bubble emerges. The magnitude of bubbles is referred to as large if all three
traders choose to buy the asset, medium if the first two traders buy, and small if only
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 1

















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 1

















(c) $ = 1 and % = 0

















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 0
Figure 3.5: The individual trading behavior
the first trader buys. We consider that there is no bubble if the first trader refuses to
buy. The simulation results are shown in Figure 3.6.
Our simulations display three main results. First, the likelihood of no bubbles initially
decreases: bubbles become more frequent when traders gain more experience. This
decrease stops after the first several runs, and the likelihood of no bubbles increases
steadily towards 1, a level that is reached after 200 runs. Second, the likelihood of large
bubbles decreases with traders’ experience pretty rapidly. Third, the likelihood of other
two types of bubbles initially increases with traders’ experience and this e!ect is more
pronounced for small bubbles: the likelihood of medium bubbles increases for the first
10 runs while the likelihood of small bubbles increases for a longer time (up to around
100 runs).
Let us now look at the e!ect of an increase in ! and %. When the imagination parameter
! equals 1 instead of 0, the likelihood of bubbles increases much more with experience.
Indeed, after a few runs, medium bubbles occur with probability 60%, instead of around
20% or 35% when ! equals 0. In addition, after a few additional runs, small bubbles also
occur with probability around 60%, instead of 25% or 45% when ! = 0. We conclude
that sophistication fosters rather than impedes bubble formation when traders learn
from past experience.
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 0


















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0


















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1


















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.6: Evolution of bubbles
When ! equals 0, traders only reinforce actions that were actually chosen, the increase
of %, the sensitivity of choices to attractions, from 1 to 1,000 reduces the likelihood
of bubbles (particularly the small ones) but does not qualitatively a!ect the results.
Moreover, when ! equals 1, increasing % has no e!ect on bubble formation. As argued
by Camerer and Ho (1999), the sensitivity to attractions is likely to be high when agents
are highly motivated. We conclude that traders’ level of motivation is not an important
factor in bubble formation.
As a result, the simulations show that the evolution of bubbles is consistent with our
analysis of individual trading behavior.
3.5 Robustness
Until now, we have studied the baseline case of our game and find that learning initially
leads to more speculation and sophistication boosts the bubbles. In the following, we
are interested the robustness of our results. Analysis in each of the following subsections
di!ers from the baseline case by only one feature: positions are random, price cap
increases, price explosiveness is modified, or price is made endogenous.
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 0

















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0

















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1

















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.7: Individual trading behavior when trading positions are random
3.5.1 Bubbles with random trading positions
In this subsection, we assume that each trader is assigned a random position in every
run, in line with Moinas and Pouget (2012). We check whether our basic results are still
consistent with this modification. Figures 3.7 display the individual trading behavior.
We can see that the qualitative results are robust: i) learning initially leads to more
speculation and trading converges to no bubble slowly; ii) an increase in the sophisti-
cation ! boosts the initial speculation, and iii) an increase in traders responsiveness to
attractions % reduces speculation only when ! = 0. The di!erence in this case is that
the bubble converges more slowly. This is because traders learn more slowly not to
speculation when their positions in the trading sequence are randomly assigned in each
run.
3.5.2 Bubbles with di"erent caps
In this subsection, we turn to study the speculative behavior and bubble formation if we
increase the price caps. Figure 3.8 and and 3.9 display the speculative trading behavior
and bubble evolution when the cap on the first price is 106. We find that, raising the
cap on the first price fosters traders’ speculation: with price cap 1, no bubble arises after
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 1























(b) $ = 1000 and % = 1























(c) $ = 1 and % = 0























(d) $ = 1000 and % = 0
Figure 3.8: The individual trading behavior when price cap is 106


















(a) $ = 1 and % = 0


















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0


















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1


















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.9: Evolution of bubbles
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around 200 runs, but with price cap 106, the bubble still emerges even after 1000 runs
(with probability 5! 10%). However, the qualitative results are the same: the increase
of ! leads to more speculation at lower prices. Similarly, the increase of sensitivity to
attractions, %, reduces speculation when traders reinforce only the actions that were
actually chosen but not when they have more imagination.
3.5.3 Bubbles with di"erent stakes
In this subsection, we check whether and how di!erent stakes may a!ect the traders’
speculation and bubble formation. In the initial study, the price for the first trader is
assumed to be 10n and the following trader is o!ered a price which is tenfold of the
previous one. Rather with stake 10, we assume that the first price is 2n (20n) and the
following price is twice (twentyfold) of the previous one. Here, we consider the case
where n = 0. In figures 3.10, a decrease in stake from 10 to 2 will lead to a faster
convergence to no bubble equilibrium, while an increase in stake from 10 to 20 will lead
to a slower convergence to no bubble equilibrium as in figures 3.11. This is because that
an increase (a decrease) in stake results in more (less) profitable trading and therefore
interferes (facilitates) the convergence to no bubble equilibrium. In addition, the e!ects
of % and ! are the same as in the initial study.
3.5.4 Bubbles with endogenous prices
In the previous analysis, we consider an exogenous price path and check whether the
market converges to the no bubble equilibrium as traders learn from past experiences. In
this section, we relax the assumption of exogenous prices: in addition to choose whether
or not to buy the asset, each trader is free to choose a price at which he proposes to sell
to subsequent traders. In this setup, for a given price, each trader has three potential
actions: not buying, buying and proposing to sell at a price which is ten times the
previous price, and buying and proposing to sell at a price which is half of the previous
price.
Potential price paths are displayed in Figure 3.12 for the case in which the first price
is always 1. The first trader decides whether to buy the asset at price 1 or not. If he
buys, he can propose to sell this asset at price of 10 or 0.5. When the selling price of
10, the second trader needs to decide whether to buy the asset or not. If he buys, he
can propose to sell back the asset at price of 100 or 5. When the selling price is 0.5 for
the first trader, the second trader also determines whether to buy the asset or not. If
he buys, he can propose to sell the asset at a price of 5 or 0.25. The third trader can
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 0


















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0


















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1


















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.10: Evolution of bubbles with stake 2


















(a) $ = 1 and % = 0


















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0


















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1


















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.11: Evolution of bubbles with stake 2







Figure 3.12: Price Path
decide whether to buy the asset and resell at two potential prices. However, regardless
of the selling price, he does not find any buyer.
Figure 3.13 depicts the frequency with which each of the eight potential price paths
is realized (including the no bubble price path that corresponds to a price of 0 all the
time). This Figure shows that it is rare for traders to sell at a price which is half
of the given price, since the proportion of trials with a price path that includes 0.25,
0.5 or 5 drops very quickly to almost 0%. The most likely price paths are those that
include 1, 10 and 100, which is consistent with our exogenous assumption on prices
when the cap on is 1. Figure 3.13 also shows that bubbles emerge even when the price
is endogenous: indeed, the likelihood of bubbles, especially small and medium bubbles,
initially rises when traders learn. This is in line with the results we found when the
price was exogenously determined. The level of the imagination parameter, !, has no
influence on bubble formation while responsiveness to attractions, %, reduces but does
not eliminate speculation.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether traders’ experience reduce their propensity to specu-
late? This paper studies a financial market populated by adaptive traders. Following
Camerer and Ho [85]’s Experience-Weighted Attraction learning model, these traders
are assumed to adjust their behavior according to actions’ past performance: according
to the law of actual e!ect, traders reinforce actions that were actually successful in the
past; according to the law of simulated e!ect, traders also reinforce actions that would
have been successful if they had been chosen. In our economic environment, because
there is a cap on the maximum price that can be achieved, no rational bubbles can form.
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(a) $ = 1 and % = 0






















(b) $ = 1000 and % = 0






















(c) $ = 1 and % = 1






















(d) $ = 1000 and % = 1
Figure 3.13: Evolution of endogenous bubbles
In the long run, the market converges to the unique no bubble equilibrium. However
we show that learning initially increases traders’ propensity to speculate. In the short
run, more experienced traders thus create more bubbles. Moreover, we show that this
e!ect is stronger when traders are more sophisticated (that is, when they use the law of
simulated e!ect) and when the price cap is higher.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Continuation conditions in the case of one big firm
Continue both projects if 2b!"A!"B # a!"A, 2b!"A!"B # a!"B and 2b!"A!"BI #
0. These three inequalities hold when "A + "B " 2b and "A, "B " c.
Continue project A while liquidate project B if a! "A > 2b! "A ! "B , a! "A > a! "B
and a! "A # 0. Hence, "A " a and "B > c.
Similarly, continue project B while liquidate project A if "B " a and "A > c.
Liquidate both projects if 2b ! "A ! "B < 0, a ! "A < 0 and a ! "B < 0. Hence
"A + "B > 2b and "A, "B > a. Q.E.D.
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A.2 Pledgeable income per project in big firms v.s. in
small firms
In the case of one big firm, the expected return or the expected pledgeable income to
































In the case of two small firms, the expected return to investors can be transformed as
































It is easy to see that 1* > 1’*, 2* > 2’* and 3’* < 0, hence the investors obtain a larger
expected return in the case of one big firm. Q.E.D
A.3 Continuation probability per project in big firms v.s.
in small firms: example
The shock of each project is uniformly distributed according to [0,#]. The density
function is 1" .
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1) If # " b, dp = 0! 0 = 0.
































"2 . We obtain
that dp " 0 if c < # " 2b, otherwise, dp > 0.
Thus, if # " b, dp = 0; if b < # " 2b, dp " 0; if # > 2b, dp > 0. Q.E.D.
A.4 The value per project in big firms v.s. in small firms:
example
1) If # " b, dv = 0! 0 = 0.



























(!#2 + (6PR ! b)#+ 8b2 ! 12bPR)
If a2+6aPR! 5ab! 2b2 # 0, we can show that dv " 0 when # % [b, c]. Otherwise, there
exists ## = 12 [(6PR ! b) !
(
3(11b2 ! 20bPR+ 12(PR)2)], such that when # % [b,##],
dv " 0, and when # % [##, c], dv > 0.



























{(6PR ! 3(a+ b))#! (12bPR + 4a2 ! 8b2 ! 8ab)}
If a2 + 6aPR ! 5ab ! 2b2 # 0, we can show that there exists a ##, where ## =
12bPR+4a2!8b2!8ab
6PR!3(a+b) # c, such that when # % (c,#
#], dv " 0 and when # % (##,+$),
dv > 0. Otherwise, we can show that dv > 0 when # % (c,+$).
Thus, if # % [0, b], dv = 0; if # % (b,##], dv " 0; and if # % (##,+$), dv > 0,
where ## % (b, 2b). Actually, if a2 + 6aPR ! 5ab ! 2b2 # 0, ## = 12bPR+4a2!8b2!8ab6PR!3(a+b)
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and ## % [c, 2b) , otherwise ## = 12 [(6PR ! b) !
(
3(11b2 ! 20bPR + 12(PR)2)] and
## % (b, c). Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Optimal Contracts in Stand-alone Operation: Moral
Hazard
The participation constraint of the outside investor PCo is always binding. If it were
not, increasing Io would increase the entrepreneurs expected income without a!ecting


















Denote U = RAu !RAd . Based on the incentive compatibility constraint of ICA, a =
1
AU .















U(Rsu !Rsd ! U) # I ! EA
RAd , U # 0,
(B.2)
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u ! Rsd ! U), the maximum investment that can
















2 > I, which implies the outside investor is still willing
to finance the project even if the entrepreneur has no endowment.











Proof of Proposition 2.1: First, consider the case where % = 0. First-order conditions
of Lagrangian L give that U = Rsu !Rsd, which is exactly the same as the case without
moral hazard. The maximum investment that provided by the outside investor without
distorting the entrepreneur’s e!ort is Rsd when R
A
d = 0. The minimum investment from
the entrepreneur without distorting the incentives is I ! Rsd. Hence, the solution that
U = Rsu !Rsd and % = 0 is feasible if and only if
EA # I !Rds . (B.4)
In this case, the optimal contract can be implemented by: the outside investor holds
debt with face value not greater than Rsd and the entrepreneur holds the equity.
If EA < I ! Rsd, % > 0. The level of e!ort in the case without moral hazard is not
attainable. The entrepreneur always invests EA and the outside investor invests I!EA.






u !Rsd !U) = I !EA is always binding. The first-order









In this case, the optimal contract can be implemented by: the outside investor holds a
risky debt with face value Rsu!U , which is greater than Rsd, and the entrepreneur holds
the equity. Q.E.D.
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B.2 Optimal Contracts in Strategic Alliances: Moral Haz-
ard
Assume that Rd + Yd +
B
2A(2B!A) (Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2 ! UB # I, which implies that
the incumbent and the outside investors are still willing to provide financing even if the
entrepreneur has no endowment.
The Lagrangian L of Program (2.25) is1












V 2 ! I ! UB+






) (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB ! I + EA},
(B.6)
where % is the shadow value of the outside investment from the incumbent and the
outside investor.
First, consider the case where % = 0. The first-order conditions of the Lagrangian L
yield that U = V = Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd, which are exactly the same as in the case
without moral hazard. In this case, the maximum investment that can be provided
by the incumbent and the outside investor together without distorting incentives is
I# = Rd + Yd ! 12B (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2 ! UB when RAd = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: In order to study the impact of the entrepreneur’s financial
participation IA on value, we need to check whether the entrepreneur’s limited liability
constraints hold (IA % [0,+$) given U = V = Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd. If the limited liability
constraints always hold, IA is neutral for value, otherwise, it is not. Since U > 0, we
only study RAd .
We first consider the case where I " I#, the maximum outside investment from incum-
bent and the outside investor is su"cient to initiate the project. The actual amount of
outside financing I ! IA = I# !RAd . (IA % [0,+$), RAd = I# ! I + IA # 0. As a result,
the financial participation of the entrepreneur is neutral for value.
Now turn to the case where I > I#, the maximum outside investment without distorting
the incentives is not enough to finance the project. If IA # I!I#, RAd = I
#!I+IA # 0.
The incentives as in the case without moral hazard are preserved. Otherwise, RAd < 0,
the incentives as in the case without moral hazard are not attainable. The value of the
innovation is reduced. Consequently, in the case where I > I#, the financial participation
of the entrepreneur can enhance the value of the innovation. Q.E.D.
1We first omit the limited liability constraints and check later whether they are satisfied.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3: In the following, we focus on the case where I < I#.
The minimum investment from the entrepreneur by preserving the incentives as without
moral hazard is I! I#. Hence, the solutions that % = 0 and U = V = Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd
are feasible if and only if
EA # I ! I#. (B.7)
If EA < I ! I#, % > 0. The first-order conditions of the Lagrangian L give that RAd = 0,


















































) (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB = I ! EA. (B.10)
From equations (B.8) and (B.9), we obtain that
U = g1(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd), (B.11)
and
V = g2(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd). (B.12)
where g1(%, A,B) =
(1+$)(B!(A!B)$)




g1(%, A,B) ! 1 =
!%(A+B +B%)
B(1 + 3%+ 2%2)!A%2
< 0, (B.13)
and
g2(%, A,B) ! 1 =
!%(B + (B !A)%)
B(1 + 3%+ 2%2)!A%2
< 0, (B.14)
U, V < Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd. In other words, both the entrepreneur and the incumbent
exert less e!ort than the case without moral hazard. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Since IA " EA, IB + Io = I ! IA # I !EA. According to
the participation constraints of the incumbent PCB, to preserve the optimal incentives
of the entrepreneur and the incumbent, IB !RBd is fixed. For a given IB, we can always
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find a RBd to keep the di!erence between the two fixed. As a result, the ex-post flexibility
in making transfers between the incumbent and the outside investor (RBd ) ensures that
the identity of the agent providing the outside financing ex-ante is irrelevant for value.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: Substituting equations (B.11) and (B.12) into equation(B.10),
we obtain that
f(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 = I ! EA ! (Rd + Yd) + UB , (B.15)
where f(%, A,B) =
(1 + %)(2A2%!AB(%! 1)2(%+ 1) + 2B2%(1 + %)2)
2A(!A%2 +B(1 + 3%+ 2%2))2
.
Since f$(%, A,B) > 0, f(%, A,B) is increasing in %.
f(0, A,B) = ! 12B and lim$&" f(%, A,B) =
B





EA < I ! I# can be rewritten as I !EA ! (Rd + Yd) +UB > ! 12B (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2.
The assumption that Rd + Yd +
B
2A(2B!A) (Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2 ! UB > I implies that
I ! EA ! (Rd + Yd) + UB < B2A(2B!A) (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2.
As a result, there always exists a unique % % (0,+$) given ! 12B (Ru !Rd+Yu!Yd)
2 <
I ! EA ! (Rd + Yd) + UB < B2A(2B!A) (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
2. Q.E.D.





f$(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2
. (B.16)
Since f$(%, A,B) > 0, the sign of
#$
#EA




the increase in the entrepreneur’s endowment tightens his financial constraint, otherwise,

















EA < I !Rsd.
(B.17)
Hence, if Y su ! Y sd " 0,
#UB
#EA
" 0. The increase in EA reduces the incumbent’s outside
option value and thus relaxes the entrepreneur’s financial constraint. If Y su ! Y sd > 0,
#UB
#EA
> 0. The increase in EA enhances the incumbent’s outside option value. It relaxes
the entrepreneur’s financial constraint if 0 < #UB#EA " 1. Otherwise, it tightens the
entrepreneur’s financial constraint. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 2.7: Consider the case where Y su ! Y sd > 0. We know that if













Y su ! Y sd
(
(Rsu !Rsd)2 + 4A(!I +Rsd)
, (B.18)





Y su ! Y sd
Rsu !Rsd
. (B.19)
If 0 < Y su ! Y sd "
(





" 1 always hold.
If Y su ! Y sd # Rsu !Rsd,
#UB
#EA










u ! Y sd < Rsu !Rsd,
#UB
#EA
> 1 holds if and only if
Y su ! Y sd >
2
(Rsu !Rsd)2 + 4A(EA ! I +Rsd). (B.20)
In other words, #UB#EA > 1 i!
EA < I !Rsd +
(Y su ! Y sd )




Otherwise, #UB#EA " 1. Q.E.D.










Since we have already studied #$#EA , we now only need to look at
#a
#$ .
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it leads to a decrease in a and a+ b. Q.E.D.
The Impact of EA on the Incumbent’s E!ort b: In the following, we will study the impact



























#$ < 0, the impact of EA on the incumbent’s e!ort b is similar to on a
and a + b. In other words, if #UB#EA < 1, the increase in EA leads to an increase in b. If
#UB
#EA
> 1, it leads to a decrease in b.
However, if 12 <
A
B < 1, we can obtain that
#b
#$ is negative when % % (0,
B
2A!B ] while
positive in % % ( B2A!B ,+$). Hence, even given
#UB
#EA
< 1 or #UB#EA > 1, the impact of EA
on b can be non-monotonic.
Proof of Proposition 2.9:
W = Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! (U + V )
= Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! (g1(%, A,B) + g2(%, A,B))(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
= (1! g1(%, A,B) ! g2(%, A,B))(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
= !
B + (B !A)%
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B.3 Optimal Financial Contracts in Strategic Alliances:
Moral Hazard and Monotonicity Constraint
In this case, the maximization program becomes
max
U,V












V 2 ! I ! UB










V 2 ! UB # I ! EA,
RAd , U # 0,




Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd Yu ! Yd # 0
Ru !Rd Yu ! Yd < 0.
(B.29)
We add the monotonicity constraint to Program (2.25).
If Yu ! Yd < 0, the monotonicity constraint is U + V " Ru !Rd. Hence, the lagrangian
L of the maximization program is












V 2 ! I+
%
0






)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB ! I + EA
1
+ ) {Ru !Rd ! U ! V }
(B.30)
B.3.1 Case 1: Yu ! Yd " !12(Ru ! Rd)
Without monotonicity constraint, we have show that U + V " 2(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd) "
Ru!Rd. The rents already satisfy the monotonicity constraint. Hence, the monotonicity
constraint has no impact on the initial results. In this case, all the propositions
are exactly the same regardless of the monotonicity constraint.
B.3.2 Case 2: !12(Ru ! Rd) < Yu ! Yd < 0
First, we look back the case without the monotonicity constraint.
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1) If EA # I ! I#, U + V = 2(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd) > Ru !Rd.
2) If EA < I ! I#,
U + V = (g1(%, A,B) + g2(%, A,B))(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)
=
(1 + %)(2B + (2B !A)%)
B(1 + 3%+ 2%2)!A%2
(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd).
(B.31)
We di!erentiate U + V with respect to % and obtain that
((U + V )
(%
=
!(2B !A)(B !A)%2 ! 2B(2B !A)%! (AB + 2B2)
(B(1 + 3%+ 2%2)!A%2)2
< 0, (B.32)
Hence, U+V decreases with % and takes value in [Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd, 2(Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd)).
Since Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd < Ru!Rd < 2(Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd), there exists a unique %$ such
that U +V = Ru !Rd. Thus, U + V " Ru !Rd if % # %$, otherwise, U +V > Ru !Rd.
Denote
I $ = Rd + Yd + f(%
$, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 ! UB > I#, (B.33)
According to equation (2.27), we obtain that if EA " I ! I $, U + V " Ru ! Rd while
I ! I $ < EA < I ! I#, U + V > Ru !Rd.
Second, we turn to the case with the monotonicity constraint.
1) If EA " I ! I $, U + V " Ru ! Rd, i.e., the rents always satisfy the monotonicity
constraint. Hence, the monotonicity constraint has no impact on the results.
2) If EA > I ! I $, the rents violate the monotonicity constraint. In this case, the
monotonicity constraint must be binding, i.e., ) > 0.
We first consider the case where % = 0. The first-order conditions of Lagrangian L yield
that
U =





A(Ru !Rd) + (A!B)(Yu ! Yd)
A+B
. (B.35)
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Hence, if EA # I ! I $$, % = 0, and the rents for the entrepreneur and the incumbent are
determined by equations (B.34) and (B.35).
If I! I $ < EA < I! I $$, % > 0 and RAd = 0. In this case, the investment constraint must
also be binding. Hence, U and V should satisfy the following two constraints.
U + V = Ru !Rd, (B.37)
and






)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB = I ! EA. (B.38)
Based on the above two conditions, we can show that
U <





A(Ru !Rd) + (A!B)(Yu ! Yd)
A+B
. (B.40)
By summarizing the above results, in the following we check the robustness of all the
propositions in the case where !12(Ru !Rd) < Yu ! Yd < 0.
Robustness of Proposition 2.2: There exists a I $$, the financial participation of
the entrepreneur increases the value of innovation if I > I $$, otherwise, his financial
participation is neutral for value.
The qualitative result of Proposition 2.2 is robust, however, the threshold investment I $$
is greater than I#. If I " I $$, the outside investment is su"cient to generate the optimal
results given the monotonicity constraint. The total value is constant regardless of EA.
However, if I > I $$, the total value of the innovation is an increasing function of EA.
Robustness of Proposition 2.3: In the case where I > I $$, the entrepreneur and the
incumbent always exert e!ort a = 1A
B(Ru!Rd)+(B!A)(Yu!Yd)





if EA # I ! I $$. Otherwise, the entrepreneur exerts less e!ort, while the incumbent may
exert more or less e!ort. However, the probability of success is always smaller.
The qualitative result of Proposition 2.3 is robust. The quantitative results have some
di!erence: i) the e!orts exerted by the entrepreneur and the incumbent when EA # I!I $$
are di!erent from that without moral hazard. ii) the incumbent may exert more e!ort,
since the monotonicity constraint is binding in the case where I ! I $ < EA < I ! I $$.
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Robustness of Proposition 2.4: The incumbent and the outside investor must pro-
vide outside financing not smaller than I ! EA. However, the identity of the agent
providing outside financing is irrelevant for value.
This Proposition is exactly the same due to the fact that the incumbent and the outside
investor can freely choose ex-ante and ex-post transfersbetween them.
Robustness of Proposition 2.5: If EA < I ! I $$, the entrepreneur is financially
constrained. The tightness of his financial constraint % satisfies




f(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 EA " I ! I !
q(%, A,B,Ru !Rd, Yu ! Yd) I ! I ! < EA < I ! I !!
(B.41)
where
q(%, A,B,Ru !Rd, Yu ! Yd) = A (Ru !Rd)2 + B(Ru !Rd)(Yu ! Yd) + C (Yu ! Yd)2, (B.42)
and
A =
B2(2B !A)%2 + 2B2(A+B)%+A(A2 + 2B2)
2AB(A+B + (2B !A)%)2
,
B =
B2(2B !A)%2 + 2B2(A+B)%+A(2A2 !AB + 3B2)
AB(A+B + (2B !A)%)2
,
C =
(B !A)2(1 + %)(3A+ (2B !A)%)
2AB(A+B + (2B !A)%)2
.










































! ) = 0,
(B.44)
and equations (B.39) and (B.40).
From equations (B.43), (B.44) and (B.39), we obtain that
U =
B + (B !A)%
A+B + (2B !A)%
(Ru !Rd) +
(B !A)(1 + %)
A+B + (2B !A)%
(Yu ! Yd), (B.45)
V =
A+B%
A+B + (2B !A)%
(Ru !Rd) +
(A!B)(1 + %)
A+ B + (2B ! A)%
(Yu ! Yd), (B.46)




B(A+B + (2B ! A)%)
(Ru !Rd) +
2B(1 + %)2 !A%(1 + %)
B(A +B + (2B !A)%)
(Yu ! Yd). (B.47)
Now plug equations(B.45) and (B.46) into equation(B.40), we can obtain the expression
of financial constraint as the function q.
Robustness of Proposition 2.6: If Y su ! Y sd " 0, an increase in the endowment
of the entrepreneur EA reduces the outside option value UB and relaxes the financial
constraint. If Y su ! Y sd > 0, an increase in the endowment EA raises the incumbent’s




Otherwise, the financial constraint is loosened.
This Proposition is always robust.
Proof: for Proposition 2.6, we di!erentiate % with respect to EA. According to equation
(B.41), we know that this proposition holds if EA " I ! I $. In the following, we focus












[(A2 !AB +B2)(Ru !Rd) + (2A2 ! 3AB +B2)(Yu ! Yd)]2
AB(A+B + (2B !A)%)3
> 0 (B.49)
Hence, Proposition 2.6 is also robust when I ! I $ < EA < I ! I $$. In addition, we can
find that % is a continuous function, hence Proposition 2.6 is robust for the whole range
of EA.
Robustness of Proposition 2.8: The entrepreneur’s e!ort and the probability of
success of the innovation increases with EA when
#UB
#EA
< 1, and decreases when #UB#EA > 1.
This Proposition is always robust.
Proof: we need to di!erentiate a and a+ b decrease with EA in the case when I ! I $ <
EA < I ! I $$.













)(Ru "Rd + Yu " Yd)U +
1
2B
(Ru "Rd)(Ru "Rd + 2(Yu " Yd))
= I " EA " (Rd + Yd) + UB .
(B.50)




























(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)! U)
.
(B.51)
When U = B!A2B!A (Ru ! Rd + Yu ! Yd), the investment from the incumbent and the



































As a result, if #UB#EA # 1,
#a
#EA
" 0 and #(a+b)#EA " 0. If
#UB
#EA




Since a and b are continuous, this proposition is robust for the whole range of EA.
B.3.3 Case 3: Yu ! Yd # 0
If Yu!Yd # 0, the monotonicity constraint is U+V " Ru!Rd+Yu!Yd. The Lagrangian
L is changed to












V 2 ! I+
%
0






)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB ! I + EA
1
+ ) {Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U ! V } .
(B.53)
In the case without monotonicity constraint, since U+V > Ru!Rd+Yd!Yd. The rents
always violate the monotonicity constraint. Therefore, in this program the monotonicity
constraint must always be binding, i.e., ) > 0.
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(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd). (B.55)
In this case, the maximum outside investment provided by the incumbent and the outside
investor together is
I $$$ = Rd + Yd +
(A2 + 2B2)
2B(A+B)2
(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 ! UB . (B.56)
If EA # I ! I $$$, % = 0 and the rents are determined by the above equations.
However, if EA < I ! I $$$, % > 0. The rents satisfy the following two conditions
U + V = Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd, (B.57)
and






)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd ! U)!
1
2B
V 2 ! UB = I ! EA. (B.58)
We can show that U < BA+B (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd) and V >
A
A+B (Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd).
Robustness of Proposition 2.2: There exists a I $$$, the financial participation of
the entrepreneur increases the value of innovation if I > I $$$, otherwise, his financial
participation is neutral for value.
Robustness of Proposition 2.3: In the case where I > I $$$, the entrepreneur and
the incumbent always exert e!ort a = 1A
B





Rd + Yu ! Yd) if EA # I ! I $$$. Otherwise, the entrepreneur exerts less e!ort and the
incumbent exert more e!ort. However, the probability of success is always smaller.
Robustness of Proposition 2.4: The proposition is exactly the same.
Robustness of Proposition 2.5: If EA < I ! I $$$, the entrepreneur is financially
constrained. The tightness of his financial constraint % satisfies
h(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2 = I ! EA ! (Rd + Yd) + UB, (B.59)
where h(%, A,B) = A
3+2B3!(1+!)+AB2(2+2!"!2)
2AB(A+B+(2B"A)!)2 , increasing in %.
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V ]!) = 0, (B.61)
and equations (B.57) and (B.58).
From equations (B.60), (B.61) and (B.57), we obtain
U =
B + (B !A)%
A+B + (2B !A)%




A+B + (2B !A)%
(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd). (B.63)
Substitute the above two equations into equation(B.58), we obtain that equation (B.59).





AB(A+B + (2B !A)%)3
> 0. (B.64)
Robustness of Proposition 2.6: The proposition is exactly the same.






h$(%, A,B)(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd)2
. (B.65)
Since the denominator is positive, Proposition 2.6 holds.
Robustness of Proposition 2.8: This proposition is exactly the same.












































(A(%! 1)!B(1 + 2%))2
(Ru !Rd + Yu ! Yd) < 0. (B.68)
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In addition, based on the results of Proposition 2.6, we can obtain that a and a + b
increase with EA if
#UB
#EA
< 1, while decrease with EA if
#UB
#EA
> 1. Hence, Proposition
2.8 holds.
B.4 Implementation of Optimal Financial Contracts
In order to be a budget breaker, the outside investor cannot hold equity in the en-
trepreneur firm, since it harms his incentives.2 Hence, the revenue in the entrepreneur
firm is only shared by the entrepreneur and the incumbent. In the following, we consider
how the revenue of the entrepreneur firm is splitted between the two agents.
B.4.1 U < Ru ! Rd
Let * be the fraction of equity the entrepreneur holds and 1!* be the fraction of equity
the incumbent holds.3 Define D is the revenue the entrepreneur receives in case of
failure. There are two possible incomes for the entrepreneur firm: Ru in case of success
and Rd in case of failure. According to the definition of preferred equity and common
equity, in case of failure, it is impossible to remunerate common equity with the same
dividend as preferred equity, while in case of success, both types of stocks generate the
same dividend.
CASE 1: the incumbent holds preferred equity while the entrepreneur holds common
equity in the entrepreneur firm.
Denote I the maximum outside investment given the e!ort levels in the case where the











I# Yu ! Yd " !12(Ru !Rd)
I $$ !12(Ru !Rd) < Yu ! Yd < 0
I $$$ Yu ! Yd # 0,
(B.69)
If EA < I ! I , the entrepreneur is financially constrained. In this case, D = RAd = 0,
* = URu . The entrepreneur obtains 0 in case of failure and U in case of success, while the
incumbent receives Rd and Ru!U respectively. It is easy to show that (1!*)Rd < Rd <
(1!*)Ru, indicating that the dividend the incumbent receives is greater than his share
2It is possible for the outside investor to hold debt in the entrepreneur firm. Nevertheless, this has
nothing to do with incentives. Without loss of generality, we neglect the possibility to hold debt.
3Equity may be common equity or preferred equity.
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of equity in case of failure and is equal to his share of equity in case of success. Thus,
the incumbent firm holds preferred equity while the entrepreneur firm holds common
equity.
In this case, the outside investment provided by the incumbent and the outside investor
I $ > I .
If EA # I ! I , the entrepreneur is not financially constrained. In this case, the en-
trepreneur obtains D in case of failure and D+U in case of success, while the incumbent
receives Rd !D and Ru ! (D + U) respectively.
In this case, RAd = D. Hence, the outside investment provided by the incumbent and
the outside investor is
I
$ = I !D. (B.70)
If the incumbent holds preferred equity while the entrepreneur holds common equity, it
indicates that
(1! *)Rd < Rd !D < (1! *)Ru, (B.71)
and
Rd !D " Rd. (B.72)
where * = D+URu . The first inequality is due to the definition of preferred equity and the
second inequality is from the limited liability condition of the entrepreneur.
Plug equation (B.70) into the above two inequalities, we can obtain that there exists
a I #, where I # = I ! RdRu!RdU , such that if I
# < I $ " I , the incumbent holds
preferred equity while the entrepreneur holds common equity.
Consequently, the incumbent holds preferred equity while the entrepreneur holds com-
mon equity if I $ > I #.
CASE 2: the incumbent holds common equity while the entrepreneur holds preferred
equity in the entrepreneur firm.
If the incumbent holds common equity while the entrepreneur holds preferred equity, it
indicates that
*Rd < D < *Ru. (B.73)
This is only possible when the entrepreneur is not financially constrained, i.e., EA #
I ! I . Similarly, plug equation (B.70) into the above inequality, we can obtain that if
I $ " I #, the incumbent holds common equity while the entrepreneur holds preferred
equity.
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In conclusion, there exists a I # < I , the incumbent holds common equity while the
entrepreneur holds preferred equity if I $ " I #, nevertheless, the incumbent holds
preferred equity while the entrepreneur holds common equity if I $ > I #.
B.4.2 U # Ru ! Rd
If EA < I ! I , the entrepreneur is financially constrained. The split of the revenue in
the entrepreneur firm is: the entrepreneur obtains 0 in case of failure and Ru!Rd in case
of success, while the incumbent receives a fixed income Rd regardless of the state. Hence,
the incumbent holds debt while the entrepreneur holds equity. In this case, I $ > I .
If EA # I !I , the entrepreneur is not financially constrained. The split of the revenue
in the entrepreneur firm is: the entrepreneur obtains D in case of failure and D+Ru!Rd
in case of success, while the incumbent receives a fixed income Rd !D regardless of the
state. If D < Rd, i.e., I $ > I # !Rd, the incumbent holds debt while the entrepreneur
holds equity. If D # Rd, i.e., I $ " I ! Rd, the incumbent holds nothing while the
entrepreneur holds full equity.
In conclusion, if I $ " I ! Rd, the incumbent holds nothing while the entrepreneur
holds full equity. If I $ > I ! Rd, the incumbent holds debt while the entrepreneur
holds equity.
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